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FOREWORD
This book presents the findings of two reports commissioned by the ACP/EU 
Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA), with funding 
from FAO. During 2012 nine case studies of value chains were implemented in 
seven countries in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. 
The present book aims to draw comparisons between value chains in these two 
regions that have much in common. The Pacific is entirely and the Caribbean 
largely made up of island nations with relatively small populations. The two 
regions have sought to promote intra-regional agricultural trade, although with 
only limited success. Meanwhile, both are becoming increasingly dependent 
on food imports, in some cases with negative impacts on nutrition. Both have 
witnessed sizable emigration and, as a consequence, have large diasporas 
that offer potential markets for products from the islands. At the same time, they 
encounter significant Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and logistical problems 
when trying to supply those diasporas and other extra-regional markets. 
The book reviews a wide range of factors affecting commercial value chain 
development in the two regions, with emphasis being placed on how the chains 
studied have maximised the inclusion of smallholders and on identifying ways in 
which they have been able to address sustainability concerns. The case studies 
used, which refer to chains supplying domestic, regional and international 
markets, aimed to draw lessons on both the critical success factors for and the 
constraints on entrepreneurial initiative and commercial viability. 
We trust that the publication will prove useful not only to governments 
but also to private companies, as well as to those supporting value chain 
development, such as donors and NGOs. The need to clarify public sector 
strategies and priorities for fostering development of value chains is essential 
for both the Caribbean and the Pacific. The agricultural sector is an important 
source of income for the poorer populations in these regions, and efficient 
value chains can make a major contribution to improving their livelihoods. 
FAO and CTA share an interest in taking stock of approaches for the 
development of environmentally sustainable value chains that are also 
economically viable; and we were pleased to have the opportunity to 
partner on this work, thus continuing the many years of fruitful collaboration 
between our two organisations. 
Michael Hailu Eugenia Serova
Director, CTA Director, Rural Infrastructure 
 and Agro-Industries Division, FAO
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This paper summarises and integrates two reports on agricultural commodity 
chains prepared in early 2013 as part of a study of ACP value chains. The 
reports were funded by FAO and commissioned by the ACP/EU Technical 
Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA). 
The two original reports cover a total of nine value chains in seven countries 
in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. The chains were all established through 
private sector initiative and have proved to be sustainable or to have the 
potential to be so. All nine chains refer to the output of a single crop or 
livestock product in a single country and, in most cases, to that part of output 
which is exported or which passes through a set of one or more exporters.
2. The case studies
Citrus/Belize Coverage: the national export value chain for frozen orange 
and grapefruit juice concentrate. Focus: the roles played by the Belize Citrus 
Growers Association and by Citrus Products of Belize Limited, which owns and 
operates the nation’s two main citrus processing plants.
Cocoa/Grenada Coverage: the output of the Grenada Organic Cocoa 
Farmers Cooperative Society. Focus: the cooperative and the Grenada 
Chocolate Company, which initiated the domestic manufacture and export 
of organic chocolate products.
Hot Peppers/Jamaica Coverage: hot peppers grown by small and medium-
scale farmers and processed and exported by the Grace Kennedy Group. 
Focus: the establishment of contract farming to supply a new processing 
facility for the production of hot pepper mash.
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Eggs/Jamaica Coverage: eggs produced by members of the Jamaica Egg 
Farmers Association and processed into liquid eggs for use principally in the 
domestic hospitality industry. Focus: producer-led value addition aimed at 
domestic sales expansion through import substitution.
Mangoes/Haiti Coverage: fresh mangoes and frozen mango pieces 
exported by JMB S.A. Focus: the role of the Association of Fruit Producers and 
Sellers from the South and value addition and quarantine treatment by JMB.
Taro/Fiji Coverage: fresh taro produced for export on the Fijian island of 
Taveuni. Focus: the triggering of rapid production growth by crop failure in 
Samoa, reversing the environmental damage on the island of Taveuni caused 
by this growth, and Australia’s protection of its taro growers.
Papaya/Fiji Coverage: papaya grown on Fiji for export in fresh form. Focus: 
the means by which Fiji re-established an export market by creating Nature’s 
Way Cooperative to run a quarantine treatment facility and the impact of 
this on the development and structure of the value chain. 
Vanilla/Vanuatu Coverage: the national export value chain for vanilla. Focus: 
the roles of the sole exporting enterprise Venui Vanilla and its partnership with an 
NGO, the Farmers Support Agency, in establishing a viable chain for a high value 
commodity produced and processed by remote farmers.
Flowers/Solomon Islands Coverage: cut flowers produced in the vicinity of 
the national capital, Honiara. Focus: the free-market response to a sudden 
increase in demand for cut flowers and flower arrangements.
3. Main f indings
• A key feature of the case studies is that market forces have driven the use 
of green investments and practices and the adoption of organisational 
structures that have green outcomes. This is because:
 { in farming, natural resources are an essential factor of production and 
the long-term viability of production consequently depends on their 
conservation
 { many means of raising profitability also incidentally conserve natural 
resources
 { green processing and transport practices are used as marketing tools 
to expand export sales and raise export prices.
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• The case studies demonstrate that value chains for agricultural 
commodities can function more efficiently and effectively when small-
scale farmers develop closer relationships with suppliers of inputs and 
services and with entities which market and process their output. The 
integration of farmers into value chains can have mutually beneficial 
outcomes both for the farmers themselves and for other value chain 
participants. Farmers can aim to supply a product that is suited to the 
requirements of processors and end users, both in terms of physical 
characteristics and the reliability and timing of supply. Processors, traders 
and other chain participants, in turn, can provide farmers with information, 
finance and training.
• Agricultural value chains in the Caribbean and especially in Pacific Island 
countries may depend on a single foreign national market or on export 
markets with similar sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. The viability 
of such chains is vulnerable to a single unpredictable event which results in 
the loss of market access.
• The unique agro-climatic, physical and cultural characteristics of the case 
study countries have enabled them to successfully exploit niche export 
markets through being able to (a) supply at times of high seasonal prices, 
(b) provide products with unique physical qualities, and (c) differentiate 
products through marketing which emphasises their exotic origins. 
• Preferential access to the European Union and to regional markets 
protected by a common external tariff can be an important positive 
factor in the development of agricultural value chains. 
• The diasporas of small island nations provide important export markets 
for traditional agricultural food commodities and products which are 
not produced in their adopted country. Where they are produced in the 
adopted country, market access may be inhibited by protective measures 
that are extremely difficult for the exporting country to challenge 
successfully.
• The case studies demonstrate that the adoption of new technologies can 
be a key factor in value chain development and, in some circumstances, 
a necessary condition for such development. The adoption of new 
technologies in the case study value chains has allowed lost export markets 
to be re-established, new high value products to be manufactured viably 
on a small-scale, waste products to be turned into valuable goods, and 
products to be processed that replace imports and expand domestic sales. 
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1. Background
In 2012 the ACP/EU Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation 
(CTA) commissioned studies of agricultural value chains in West, Central 
and East Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.1 These studies, which were 
commissioned at the request of and funded by FAO, focused on issues 
relating to green and inclusive chains that were established through private 
sector initiative and which have proved to be sustainable or have the 
potential to be sustainable.
A report for each region was prepared in early 2013. This report summarises 
and integrates the findings of the reports that cover the Caribbean and 
Pacific regions, focusing on innovative and otherwise interesting aspects of 
chain structure and development. 
2. The Nature of the Value Chains Covered by the 
Case Studies 
2.1 The concept of value chains
There as many definitions of ‘agricultural commodity value chains’ as there 
are studies purporting to refer to such chains. The term ‘chain’ refers to the 
fact that most agricultural commodities are subjected to a sequence of 
activities prior to final consumption, such as post-harvest cleaning and sorting, 
grading, storing, transporting, processing, packaging, transporting, wholesaling 
and retailing. ‘Value’ refers to the fact that value is added by these activities 
as the commodity and products derived from it move down the chain. 
1  Value Chain Assessment for Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, Paul Wagubi, December 2012. Appraisal 
of Value Chain Development in West and Central Africa, Victor Antwi, October 2012. An Assessment 
of Agri-Food Value Chains in the Caribbean, Robert A. Best, October 2012. Appraisal of Value Chain 
Development in the Pacific Islands, Koko Siga Pacific, July 2012. 
IntroductionII
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A value chain, as opposed to a simple supply chain, involves collaboration 
between enterprises within the chain aimed at improving their efficiency and 
competitiveness. Chains tend to be more efficient and the net income which 
they generate tends to be more equitably distributed when they are well 
governed and managed and embody a two-way flow of information both 
vertically and horizontally. It is also important that procedures, such as price 
formation and commodity grading, are as transparent as possible and that 
individuals and enterprises operating within the chain develop dependable 
relationships founded on trust.2
The case studies covered in this report have in common the fact that they refer 
to the output of a single crop or livestock product grown or produced in a 
single country and cover activities from production through to the point of final 
consumption and use. In most cases the studies refer to only a part of the national 
output of the crop/livestock product in question, either focussing only on that part 
exported or that part which passes through a subset of one or more processors or 
exporters. Throughout, for each case study, we use the term ‘value chain’ to refer 
to the network of paths and businesses that are the focus of the study.
2.2 Value chain selection
The value chains were selected for study because they were established and 
developed principally by the private sector and have interesting inclusive, 
green and other characteristics. This non-random selection means that 
the chains studied cannot be taken as representative of the regions as a 
whole. Thus no attempt is made to draw definitive conclusions on differences 
between regions. The main aim of this report is to discuss interesting features 
and findings and to illustrate them with reference to one or more of the case 
studies.
The Caribbean report covers the value chains for four crops and one 
livestock commodity (eggs). These were selected for study from an initial list 
of 10, with the aim of covering chains with differing governance structures 
and diverse technological, product and market configurations. The crops 
and products derived from them are principally exported. The eggs are sold 
domestically in fresh and processed form. The Pacific Islands report is based 
on analysis of the value chains for four export crops, three of which are 
principally exported. The fourth value chain is for domestically marketed cut 
flowers. Descriptors of the case studies in the two regions are given in Table 1.
2  Notwithstanding this, at points in chains where prices are determined by competition, it is essential 
that competition is free and fair and that cooperation does not extend to price-distorting collusion.
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2.3 Characteristics of the selected value chains
Other than for Belize, all the case studies in the two regions refer to 
commodities produced in small island nations.3 It will be seen from Table 
1 that these states differ significantly in terms of total land area, land use, 
population, population density and GDP per capita. In the Pacific, the three 
nations covered by the case studies consist of sets of islands, whereas in the 
Caribbean they comprise single islands or contiguous land areas.
It should be noted that each of the Caribbean case studies focuses on that 
part of the total output of the selected crop that at one point in the value 
chain passes through a single commercial entity. The Pacific studies, other 
than that of floriculture in the Solomon Islands, tend to cover most or all 
national exports of the commodity studied.4
3  Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic.
4  Some of which are processed and/or exported by a single entity.
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Main destinations Dominant grower(s)Total land 
area (km2)








Mangoes Fresh branded, IQF, dried Haiti 27,560 64.2 10,188,000 771 USA Small
Citrus
Concentrate, essential oil, 
feed
Belize 22,806 6.9 357,000 4,577 USA, EU, Japan Large
Eggs Eggs: fresh, liquid Jamaica 10,831 41.5 2,730,000 5,472 Domestic Large
Peppers Sauces, mash Jamaica 10,831 41.5 2,700,000 5,472 US, EU, CARICOM Small
Cocoa Chocolate bars Grenada 344 32.4 104,000 7,845 US, EU, domestic Large
Pacific Islands
Taro Fresh taro Fiji 18,274 23.4 854,000 4,438 New Zealand, Australia Small
Papaya Fresh papaya Fiji 18,274 23.4 854,000 4,438 New Zealand, Australia Small
Vanilla Vanilla beans/concentrate Vanuatu 12,189 15.3 246,000 3,176 Aus. NZ. Japan, domestic Small
Flowers Flowers Solomon Islands 27,986 3.3 536,000 1,835 Domestic Small
Sources: Total land area: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2 
  Percentage of land used for agriculture in 2011 (including permanent pasture): World 
Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.AGRI.ZS/countries 
  Population: World Atlas http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/populations/ctypopls.htm#.
UjyRxcasjvY 
  GDP per capita in 2012: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
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THE CASE STUDIES







The Citrus Products of Belize Value Chain1
1.1 National and international context
1.1.1 Belize’s physical and socio-economic characteristics
Belize is the only non-island country covered by the Caribbean-Pacific case 
studies. It is located in Central America adjacent to the Caribbean, bordered 
by Mexico to the North and Guatemala to the West and South. Its total 
land area is a little smaller than that of Haiti and a little larger than that of 
Jamaica. The majority of the country’s land is forested, with about 20% used 
for agriculture. Belize has the lowest population density in Central America, 
only some 13% of that of Jamaica and less than 4% of that of Haiti. Its GDP 
per capita is slightly less than that of Jamaica and similar to Fiji.
More than half the population of Belize now lives in urban areas. Less than 
a quarter of the national labour force works in agriculture. Some 97% of all 
agricultural labour is male.
Virtually all agricultural production in Belize comprises food crops. Of these, 
citrus has the highest total farm-gate value, followed by sugar, bananas, 
maize, aquaculture and poultry. Oranges and grapefruit are the main types 
of citrus grown. The weight of national grapefruit production is about one 
quarter that of oranges.
1.1.2 The world citrus market
Brazil is the world’s largest producer of fresh oranges and orange juice, 
followed by the USA. Brazil dominates world trade in orange juice, 
accounting for 80% of global exports by producing countries. The USA both 
imports and exports significant quantities of orange juice, accounting in total 
for about 10% of global trade. Belize’s neighbour, Mexico, is the third largest 
exporter. Globally, the EU is by far the largest importer.
The USA is the main market for Belizean orange juice, followed by the 
Caribbean, the EU and Japan. Belizean production and exports of orange 
juice are small by world standards. In 2011, its exports were less than 3% of 
those of Brazil.5
5  All data in this sub-section refer to tonnage. Most world trade in orange juice is in the form of unfro-
zen concentrate, whereas some 97% of Belizean exports are in frozen form. Consequently Belize is a 
fairly large player in the global frozen orange concentrate market, with exports equal to about 12% 
of those of Brazil.
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In recent years the annual global production of fresh grapefruit juice has 
been around 5 million tons. About half of this is produced and consumed in 
China. The USA, South Africa and Turkey are the largest exporters. The EU is by 
far the largest importer, followed by Russia and Japan.
Belizean exports of grapefruit juice are more significant globally than for 
orange juice. In 2011, its estimated exports were equal to 11% of those of the 
largest exporter, the USA6.
1.2 The citrus products of Belize value chain
1.2.1 Production
The citrus industry is an important foreign exchange earner for Belize, 
generating around BZ$60 million (US$30 million) per year, some 10% of 
national merchandise export earnings. Citrus growing supports the livelihoods 
of around 500 farm families and 2,000 hired workers, plus a further 12,000 
casual labourers who are employed during the harvest season.
The first citrus plantation in Belize was established in 1913 and the first citrus pro-
cessing plant in 1948. The national citrus area peaked at almost 30,000 hectares 
in 1999. After falling steeply to a low of under 15,000 hectares in 2002 and 2003, 
there has been a moderate recovery in recent years to around 18,000 hectares. 
Of this, around 85% is Valencia oranges and 15% grapefruit.7
Citrus production peaked in 2006 at 335,000 tons. Production in 2013 is 
projected to be some 213,000 tons, down from 237,000 tons in 2012 (Figure 1). 
The industry is dominated by relatively large estates, with 32 farms of over 
300 acres (121 ha) accounting for nearly 70% of the total citrus acreage. The 
remaining acreage is located mainly on some 500 medium and small-scale 
farms, the majority of which have 3-10 acres planted to citrus. In addition, 
there are many small farms that have a few backyard citrus trees or small 
groves.
Until recently all medium and large-scale commercial growers were members 
of the Belize Citrus Growers Association (BCGA). Small-scale growers with from 
6  All the trade data in this section are from the UN Comtrade Database for 2011. Comparisons are 
with Brazil and the USA rather than with global trade due to incomplete global data. (http://com-
trade.un.org/db/mr/rfCommoditiesList.aspx?px=H1&cc=2009).
7  These percentages are of harvested area. Source: FAOSTAT, FAO Statistics Division 2013, 01 July 2013.
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one to three acres of citrus are registered as non-voting provisional BCGA 
members. In July 2009 a group of large citrus growers, which accounts for 
about 40% of the national crop, established an alternative to BCGA: Belize 
Citrus Mutual (BCM). This group decided to separate completely from BCGA 
in 2012.
Source: FAOSTAT, FAO Statistics Division 2013, 01 July 2013
TABLE 2: SIZE STRUCTURE OF CITRUS PLANTATIONS
No. of farms Total hectares % of total
Above 121 ha 32 12,633 12,633
Above 121 ha 32 12,633 12,633
Above 121 ha 32 12,633 12,633
Below 20 ha 32 12,633 12,633
Total 32 12,633 12,633
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The cornerstone of BCGA’s support for small and medium-scale growers is its 
majority ownership of Citrus Products of Belize Limited (CPBL), the company to 
which small-scale farmers sell their citrus (see sub-section 2.2, below). BCGA 
negotiates annually the prices at which CPBL purchases citrus. Payment per box 
is made according to a formula that reflects the brix8 and the percentage of 
solids in the delivered fruit. For each delivery, farmers receive a set of payments. 
An advance is paid on delivery equivalent to 65% of the estimated final price 
negotiated between BCGA and CPBL prior to the start of the harvest on 
the basis of a submission by CPBL. One or more further payments is made to 
growers during the crop year, raising the total unit payment to the agreed final 
estimate. BCGA monitors Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) futures prices for 
frozen concentrate orange juice and requests revision of the final price estimate 
should the CBOT price deviate during the delivery season by more than 10% 
from that used in the original CPBL submission. Once agreed on the basis of a 
new submission by CPBL, the revised estimated price is then reflected fully in the 
prices which CPBL pays to growers.
The representation of small-scale farmers in both BCGA and on the Board of 
CPBL (through BCGA’s membership of the Board) means that small farmers 
can sell their fresh citrus on the same terms and at the same price as the 
main estates.
In addition to receiving the negotiated price, growers benefit from the 
following set of programmes and services provided by BCGA and CPBL:
• Production and logistics scheduling through a Harvest Committee 
supported technically by the CPBL Fruit Logistics Department.
• Machinery services for mainly small-scale growers to weed groves 
mechanically and to transport fruit to a processing plant.
• Input supply stores where growers can purchase agro-chemicals and 
diesel fuel at cost price.
• Access to various lines of credit at subsidised interest rates, including loans 
of up to one month at zero interest.
• HLB (citrus greening) control and management.9
8  A measure of the sucrose content of citrus juice and other aqueous solutions.
9  Huanglongbing (HLB) is a bacterial disease that attacks the vascular system of plants.
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• Support from the BCGA Citrus Research and Education Institute (CREI), 
including:
 { advice on grove management practices
 { certified nurseries that provide improved and disease-free planting 
material
 { information and training on the control of pests and diseases
 { soil and foliar nutrition testing.
• Advocacy on matters affecting the interests of growers.
Funding for these services is provided from BCGA fees levied on fresh fruit 
deliveries to the factory, from a Social Security Revolving Loan Fund, and by 
low interest loans from the European Investment Bank and the Development 
Finance Corporation earmarked to finance the replanting of groves with 
disease-resistant rootstock. 
The large estates which are members of BCM are currently not paying the 
BCGA cess. This has reduced BCGA’s income significantly and is constraining 
its activities, especially those of CREI. These estates have also contracted out 
of the HLB Control Programme, reducing its effectiveness. 
1.2.2 Processing
The canning of orange and grapefruit juice in Belize began in 1935. The first 
large scale processing plant was established in 1948 by the Citrus Company 
of Belize Ltd. and a second was erected nearby in 1963 by Belize Food Prod-
ucts Ltd. The processing industry subsequently grew and developed through 
the creation of additional companies. In 2001, the industry was unified both 
horizontally and vertically and brought under single ownership through a 
programme of acquisition by the Commonwealth Development Corpora-
tion (CDC). This eventually led to the creation of a single company, Citrus 
Products of Belize Ltd. (CPBL), in which the Belize Citrus Growers Association 
(BCGA) acquired a 99.78% shareholding in October 2002.10 In 2006, the Bar-
bados-based company, Bank Holdings Ltd (BHL), acquired 41.93% of CBPL’s 
shares. It added a further 4.66% in 2010. These BHL investments were aimed at 
leaving BCGA as the majority owner while giving CPBL the capacity to de-
velop and market value-added products in the Caribbean region. However, 
subsequent investment by CPBL into new equipment to add value to its prod-
10  BCGA made this acquisition through its investment arm, Belize Citrus Growers Association Invest-
ment Company Ltd, which it established in 2000.
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ucts, establish an animal feed production facility and a power co-generation 
capacity has been financed by loans to be repaid out of future profits, rather 
than from BHL’s injection of capital.
CPBL and its subsidiaries currently own a number of citrus farms, two citrus 
processing plants which produce citrus concentrate and essential oils, a 
bottling plant, and a feed and essential oils plant that also provides waste 
by-products to a cogeneration plant that supplies power to one of the fresh 
citrus processing plants. CPBL produces a wide range of products, some of 
which are customer-branded and packed ready for retailing. These include 
orange and grapefruit concentrated and frozen, freeze-concentrated 
and not-from-concentrate juice, squash, pulp cells, cold pressed oil, and oil 
phase essence.
CPBL now has an estimated total annual processing capacity of some 400,000 
tons of fresh citrus. This is well above its recent levels of annual throughput. In 
2013, its plants are expected to operate at only some 56% of capacity. The 
company made losses of BZ$10million in 2010 and BZ$11 million in 2011, but 
recorded a small profit in 2012.11
1.2.3 Exporting
Belizean citrus concentrate has a taste profile and composition that reflects 
the subtropical ecosystem in which the fruits are grown. This profile, coupled 
with a naturally sweet, high acid-brix ratio, allows CPBL to gain access to and 
sell at a price premium in markets that are sensitive to the addition of sugar 
and other sweeteners. In these markets, bottlers and packers blend Belizean 
concentrate with bulk concentrates to meet customers’ specifications. 
Small amounts of CPBL’s products are sold in the domestic market with the 
lion’s share being exported to CARICOM nations, the USA, the EU and Japan.
The competitiveness of exports has been enhanced through a set of 
Government measures, including:
• granting CPBL EPZ status, providing ‘no tax status’, and the exemption 
of duties on imported merchandise, such as packaging material and 
processing equipment
• Belize’s membership of CARICOM; this allows it to benefit from the 
11  The BZ$ is pegged to the US$ at a rate of BZ$ 1.0 = US$ 0.5.
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community’s trade measures, such as the 35% regional external CET which 
gives protection to CPBL’s products in CARICOM markets
• Belize’s participation in the Lomé Caribbean Basin Initiative, which allows 
duty free access to EU countries
• the 2010 Belize-Guatemala Partial Scope Agreement, which allows CPBL to 
export its products to the Guatemalan market at reduced rates of import duty.
In addition, CPBL has obtained ISO 14001:1996 certification, its citrus value 
chain is certified as food safe through ISO 9000 (which includes HACCP and 
Kosher compliance), and it is eligible to sell its products as Almost Pesticide 
Free. This has allowed it to supply both orange and grapefruit juice profitably 
to distant markets, notably the EU and Japan. 
1.2.4 The full value chain
The value chain is relatively straightforward, in that input supply is largely in 
the hands of BCGA and all processing of the fresh fruits is undertaken by a 
single umbrella company, CPBL, which is the sole supplier of processed citrus 
products to both the domestic and export market.
There are substantial economies of scale in the making of citrus products, 
especially in the processing and transportation of concentrate. Despite its 
proximity to Mexico and the USA, which are two of the world’s largest citrus 
producers, and competition from very low-cost Brazilian production and 
export of bulk consignments of orange juice, the industry in Belize has been 
able to survive and, until the last few years, expand its exports strongly. This 
has been achieved through a combination of (a) the beneficial impact 
of the preferential trade measures listed in sub-section 2.3, above, (b) 
exploitation of the unique taste characteristics of Belizean citrus to provide 
consignments for mixing with lower-priced concentrates, and (c) through the 
adoption of remunerative green strategies, including the productive use of 
the by-products of processing.
Continuation of these strategies is likely to make the CPBL value chain 
sustainable provided all the key players in the national citrus sector revert to 
working in harmony towards common goals.
V A L U E  C H A I N S  I N  T H E  C A R I B B E A N  A N D  T H E  P A C I F I C  I S L A N D S22
1.3 Innovative and interesting features
1.3.1 The inclusion of small-scale growers in the value chain
The production of citrus in Belize is dominated by relatively large estates. 
However, the industry, through the BCGA, has traditionally provided a wide 
range of services to all growers, with some targeted principally at small-scale 
growers. The industry’s support of small and medium-scale growers stems from:
• the commercial need of CPBL to increase national production to raise 
throughput and reduce unit processing costs
• the desire of a grower-owned industry to use the industry as the foundation 
for the development of local communities in producing areas. 
The recent creation of BCM in effect means that small-scale growers are now 
institutionally more integrated into the value chain than are a set of large 
growers. However, the creation and actions of BCM have harmed small-scale 
farmers by weakening BCGA.
1.3.2  The introduction of green chain initiatives driven by the 
concurrence of benefits
Although the industry does not make any products certified as organic, it 
has adopted measures to reduce the use of agro-chemicals, to use fuel and 
natural resources more efficiently, to minimise the output of waste products 
and to lessen pollution. These measures have included:
• raising the efficiency of citrus production through the adoption of 
biological pest control methods and reduced use of chemicals, improved 
nutrition testing and management, and the payment of farmers on the 
basis of the weight of marketable product rather than total weight of the 
delivered fruit
• adopting production planning and scheduling to reduce post-harvest 
costs and losses
• maximising use of the byproducts of processing through the extraction of 
essential oils, the use of wet residue to make compost that is provided to 
small-scale farmers free of charge, the manufacture of animal feed, and the 
drying of remaining residues for use as fuel for the generation of electricity
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• reducing the pollution of rivers and other environmental contamination by 
making productive use of byproducts and through treating liquid waste 
using an effluent pond system to reduce its biological and chemical 
oxygen demand12
• the recycling of water used in processing
• switching from bunker sea fuel to sweet crude oil and improving the 
logistics of fruit and product haulage to reduce carbon emissions.
Virtually all these measures have a positive impact on the environment while 
simultaneously enhancing CPBLs profitability. For example, the extraction of 
essential citrus oils has (a) allowed CPBL to provide concentrate to exacting 
taste specifications through the reintroduction of the oil into consignments 
tailored to individual orders and (b) prevented release of the oil into local 
rivers where, together with the release of effluent with high biological and 
chemical oxygen demand, it formerly led to significant fish kill. The measures 
have also meant that it has been technically easier to treat the remaining 
liquid waste at a lower cost simply by using a system of effluent ponds, with 
the result that growers and other members of their community no longer face 
the unpleasant odour and local pollution previously caused by the dumping 
of untreated effluent.
12  See William Usher, The Use of Effective Microorganism Technology (EM) in the Waste Water Treat-
ment Ponds of Belize Sugar Industry Limited, undated. http://www.fundases.org/userfiles/file/7.%20
BELIZE%20EM_Presentation_Summary_BSI_Wastewater_Treatment.pdf
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Grenada 
The Value Chain of the Grenada Organic 
Cocoa Farmers Co-operative Society Limited2
2.1 National context
Grenada is the most southerly of the Windward Islands, located about 140 
km to the north of Venezuela and 2,500 km to the south-east of Florida. It 
is by far the smallest of the case-study countries with a land area of 344 sq 
km, less than 11,000 ha of agricultural land, and a population of just 110,000. 
Annual GDP per capita in Grenada is approximately US$7,850. The country’s 
economy is based largely on tourism, with agriculture accounting for only 
approximately 6% of GDP. 
The island comprises a set of inactive volcanoes, circled by sloping land 
suitable for cultivation.13 Well over 90% of agricultural land is planted to 
permanent crops.14 Grenada is on the southern periphery of the hurricane 
belt and suffered devastating damage in 2004 and 2005 that destroyed 
most of its tree crops. The national economy has largely recovered, but at 
the expense of accumulating a large public-debt burden. There has been a 
partial recovery in tree-crop production. 
Agriculture was originally plantation-based but is now undertaken mainly 
by smallholders. Grenada’s main merchandise exports are nutmeg and 
mace, bananas, cocoa, fruits and vegetables. Its main export partners are 
other Caribbean Islands. Grenada imports substantial amounts of grains for 
processing into flour and feed. Small amounts of staple foodstuffs are grown 
on the island, including banana, sweet potato, cassava, yam, peas, maize, 
cabbage, golden apple and mango.
Cocoa, once an important plantation crop, has fallen in importance. 
Production capacity has yet to recover fully from damage by the 2004 and 
2005 hurricanes. It is currently produced principally on small and medium-
sized holdings.
2.2  The Grenada Organic Cocoa Farmers Co-
operative Society Ltd value chain
2.2.1 Coverage of the chain
This case study refers to the value chain for organic cocoa produced by the 
13  Fourth National Report of Grenada to the Convention on Biological Diversity, undated.
14  Grenada Agricultural Census, 1995. This would seem to be the latest comprehensive survey of agri-
culture in Grenada.
V A L U E  C H A I N S  I N  T H E  C A R I B B E A N  A N D  T H E  P A C I F I C  I S L A N D S28
Grenada Organic Cocoa Farmers Cooperative Society (OCFCS), fermented 
and dried at a single facility, and manufactured into high-value chocolate 
products by the Grenada Chocolate Company (GCC). The value chain is 
very small, comprising only some 13 farms and a total of about 60 Grenadian 
stakeholders. GCC is one of the world’s smallest chocolate manufactures, 
accounting for about one hundred-thousandth (0.001%) of world production.
2.2.2 Production
The OCFCS currently comprises 13 growers who farm 150 acres of organically 
certified cocoa. These growers include the large Belmont Estate, which joined 
the cooperative after converting 100 acres of its cocoa trees into organic 
production. Belmont Estate is a 500-acre plantation which was established 
in the 17th century to grow coffee. It switched to sugar production in the 
18th century and has grown cocoa and nutmeg since the 19th century. The 
estate recently moved into cruise-ship based agro-tourism centred around 
its cocoa operations. One OCFCS member is the London-based Rococo 
Chocolates Ltd., which acquired a small Grenadian cocoa farm in 2007 as a 
joint venture with the founder of the GCC. The other OCFCS members farm 
from 2-10 acres of cocoa each and account for about 25% of the cocoa 
processed by GCC. The OCFCS farms account for about one-third of the total 
area planted to cocoa on Grenada. They are substantially larger than most 
agricultural holdings on the island, the majority of which are of less than two 
acres. Farmers are paid on a timely basis for their organic deliveries at a price 
substantially above that paid to traditional cocoa farmers for their deliveries 
to the Grenada Cocoa Board (recently EC$ 2.00/lb vs. EC$ 1.40/lb).15
2.2.3 Processing
Prior to Belmont Estate joining OCFCS, all of the members’ cocoa production 
was dried and fermented by GCC. After Belmont joined, GCC entered into 
an agreement for it to take over this function at its fermentary, one of three 
located on Grenada. The transport of wet beans to the factory is provided by 
GCC free of charge. 
2.2.4 Manufacturing
The key player in the establishment and development of the chain was the 
15  All exports of cocoa beans must pass through the Grenada Cocoa Board. OCFCS members’ co-
coa is not subject to this provision since it is exported by GCC in the form of manufactured prod-
ucts.
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late Mott Green, an appropriate technology activist.16 Some 15 years ago, 
in partnership with another American and a Grenadian cocoa farmer, he 
raised the funds to establish GCC. He then commenced refurbishing antique 
processing equipment dating from the early 1900s and custom-building small-
scale processing technology suited to the manufacture of cocoa products in 
Grenada. In 2004 he began purchasing organic beans from small farmers and 
in 2007 established his own 10-acre cocoa plot in partnership with Rococco 
Chocolates Ltd.
The GCC processing factory is located in the heart of Grenada’s cocoa 
growing area. The factory is partially powered by a solar energy facility and 
employs highly labour-intensive processes based on traditional methods, 
which result in high-quality products with their own distinctive taste 
characteristics. All OCFCS members have shares in GCC.17 The company 
employs 13 staff, of which one is a farm supervisor, who, with two other 
workers, comprise a field crew which provides a set of services to the 
cooperative which, in turn, supplies technical advice to OCFCS farmers. 
These services are provided by GCC without charge. All the factory workers 
receive equal pay set at a level above that paid to most agricultural workers 
in Grenada. 
The output of GCC has grown from an initial two tons of product per annum in 
the early 2000s to a current level of 22 tons. The GCC product range now in-
cludes six different organic chocolate bars with a chocolate content of 60-100%, 
over ten different organic chocolate bonbons filled with mixtures based on tropi-
cal fruits, and fine organic cocoa. The chocolate has a unique flavour valued by 
gourmet consumers, which derives from both the distinctive taste characteristics 
of the beans, the oversight of the fermentation process by the chocolate manu-
facturer, and the skilled manual manufacturing methods employed.
2.2.5 Marketing and markets
The chocolate is marketed as a unique product whose taste characteristics 
stem from Grenada’s high-quality, fine-flavoured cocoa varieties grown in a 
volcanic Caribbean terroir, unadulterated by bulk cocoas grown in the major 
producing countries, and which has been organically grown, processed 
and manufactured in a socially and environmentally responsible manner. 
Most sales are made domestically during the Grenada tourist season. GCC’s 
products are also exported to speciality dark chocolate retailers based in 
16  Mott Green died in a working accident in Grenada on 1st June 2013.
17  Mott Green, The Secret Caribbean with Trevor McDonald, BBC TV.
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New York and London, which sell gourmet products through websites with 
delivery by courier. The company’s products are also retailed in Europe after 
distribution through a growing network of wholesalers.
In 2012, to further publicise GCC’s products, Mott Green shipped a 
consignment of GCC chocolate from Grenada to England in a Dutch-owned 
square-rigged wooden sailing ship, allowing the consignment to be marketed 
as the world’s first carbon-neutral freighted chocolate.
All GCC production is certified as organic and GCC has nurtured a strong 
fair and ethical trade image. Organic certification is carried out by a CERES-
certified body which undertakes annual audits and training in keeping with 
USDA and EC regulations. The products have packaging which identifies them 
as organic and differentiates them from bulk and other gourmet chocolate 
by emphasising their exotic Grenadian origin. Mott Green reinforced their 
position in the market by skilfully publicising their organic and ethical origins. 
This has allowed sale at high prices to tourists in Grenada and at eye 
wateringly high prices by the two USA and UK-based specialist retailers.18
2.3 Innovative and interesting features
2.3.1 Mode of increased value addition
This chain differs from the chains for the rest of Grenada’s cocoa output in 
that, rather than being exported after fermentation and drying, the beans 
are manufactured in Grenada into high-value finished products packed 
in a form ready for retailing. The resulting value addition within Grenada is 
several times the gross FOB value of a similar tonnage of non-organic beans 
exported in raw form. 
The total value of retail sales in Grenada and abroad is sufficient to cover 
the costs of manufacture, processing and marketing and the provision of 
free advice and services to farmers, while leaving a surplus that allows the 
payment of a higher farm-gate price than is obtained by other Grenadian 
18  For example, Rococo Chocolate was selling GCC chocolate bars transported to England under 
sail at an ‘introductory’ price of £12.95 per 100 grams compared with UK supermarket prices of 
£0.30 per 100 grams of low-quality ‘value’ chocolate bars and £1.00 for branded bars with 74% 
cocoa content. See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2012/may/11/carbon-neu-
tral-chocolate http://www.tesco.com/groceries/Product/Search/Default.aspx?searchBox-
=plain+dark+chocolate&newSort=true&search.x=-1682&search.y=-63&search=Search
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growers.19 Thus, in addition to creating jobs in manufacturing and domestic 
retailing, establishment of the chain has improved the livelihoods of a 
small number of farm households and workers engaged in fermenting, 
manufacturing and retailing.
2.3.2  The use of green and environmentally friendly methods to create 
niche markets
The small size of GCC output has allowed the relatively small demand genera-
ted by cruise-based tourism in Grenada to provide the core market for the 
firm’s output, which has served as a foundation for GCC to exploit niche mar-
kets for gourmet chocolate in developed countries. GCC initially accessed 
the local tourist market at Grenada’s cruise ship complex and subsequently 
partnered with Belmont Estate in a mutually beneficial relationship in which 
Belmont has diversified into agro-tourism linked to the cocoa value chain and 
GCC has used this agro tourism as a means of expanding its sales of manufac-
tured chocolate products. The green, environmentally friendly and socially re-
sponsible nature of the value chain, in turn, has been used by GCC to expand 
into high-value e-commerce export markets. 
Given the small size of national cocoa production, it would seem possible that 
the chain could be duplicated on a small-scale in other cocoa producing 
countries which similarly have a combination of (a) well defined terroirs that 
serve as a basis for differentiation and (b) domestic tourist-based niche markets 
or a sufficiently large number of high-income, green and socially respon sible 
households prepared to pay very high prices for speciality cocoa products.
2.3.3  The importance to chain establishment and growth of the long-term 
commitment of a single, altruistic, multi-skilled entrepreneur
Establishment and development of the value chain was driven for more than 
a decade by the late Mott Green. Importantly, he was a multi-skilled entrepre-
neur, with the ability to identify the opportunity to develop such a chain, the 
technical and management skills to design, fabricate and install the neces-
sary plant and equipment, and the persistence to maintain and operate the 
machinery and continuously refine and promote the product. These skills were 
allied with a high degree of altruism which motivated him to develop a ‘green’ 
19  In addition to higher farm-gate prices, the use of organic methods eliminates expenditure by grow-
ers on agricultural chemicals. The intensive advice provided by GCC staff also reportedly results 
in higher per-acre yields than achieved by Grenada’s other small-scale cocoa farmers. However, 
organic production requires a higher labour input, possibly leading to no net advantage over other 
Grenadian cocoa farmers in terms of net return to labour. 
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chain in which a close-knit set of participants were treated fairly. Given its very 
small size, it is unlikely that the chain could have been commercially sustaina-
ble had the necessary skills been provided by several salaried staff or by hiring 
consultants. Thus, success of the chain was highly dependent on the chain 
being initiated and developed by a multi-talented person able to provide the 
necessary wide range of hands-on skills at low cost.
2.3.4 The need for small-scale chain leaders to utilise business alliances
Small stakeholders frequently turn to NGOs or donors to provide financial 
support for value-chain development. In practice it is invariably more 
effective to build alliances with commercial enterprises that have established 
capacity rather than seeking to create such capacity from scratch. This is 
well demonstrated by the success of GCC which depended, inter alia, on 
the ability of Mott Green to make alliances with the following diverse set of 
people and enterprises:
• a US partner who provided initial loan support
• farmers who were willing to switch to organic production
• Belmont Estate which provided well managed fermentation facilities and 
links to cruise ship tourism
• chocolate retailers prepared to share their e-commerce platforms 
• a UK customer prepared to own a 10-acre farm jointly
• Fairtransport Limited with whom he shipped cocoa to Europe on the 
brigantine sailing ship ‘Tres Hombres’.
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Jamaica 
The Grace Agro Processors 
Hot Pepper Value Chain3
3.1 National context
Jamaica is located in the western Caribbean, 145km to the south of Cuba 
and 191km to the west of Haiti. It is the second most populous of the case-
study countries (after Haiti) and is third in terms of both total and arable land 
area (after Haiti and Fiji). In 2012 Jamaica had a per capita GDP of some 
US$5,472, the second highest of the case study countries, after Grenada.
Jamaica consists of fertile coastal plains and a rugged interior, with a moun-
tainous spine rising to 2,256 metres. The climate is tropical. Agriculture ac-
counts for about 20% of the national labour force but for only some 6% of 
GDP. In the interior, the main agricultural activity is the small-scale production 
of foodstuffs. Large-scale plantations dominate the more fertile coastal areas. 
In total, there are about 190,000 small farms of less than five acres. Jamaica’s 
main crops are sugarcane, bananas, coffee, citrus, yams, ackees20, and veg-
etables. The main livestock outputs are poultry meat, pork and milk. Cereals, 
which comprise an important source of calories, are almost wholly imported.
Of its population of 2.7 million, over 900,000 live in the capital, Kingston. 
Extensive emigration, principally in the second half of the last century, has 
led to a large Jamaican diaspora. This is thought to number over 2 million, of 
which the majority are in the UK, the USA and Canada.
Jamaica’s main exports are alumina and bauxite. Sugar and rum account 
for about 40% of the value of exports derived from domestic agricultural 
production, followed by yams and other root crops, coffee and ackees. 
Jamaica’s main export partners are the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands. Roughly half of the country’s merchandise imports 
comprise petroleum, other minerals and chemicals. Its other main imports are 
vehicles, other manufactured goods, cereals for milling and other foodstuffs.
3.2  The Grace Agro Processors Hot Pepper value 
chain
3.2.1 Definition, scale and background
This case study refers to peppers which are grown by a small number of small 
and medium scale Jamaican farmers and sold to the Grace Agro Processors 
20  Blighia sapida, a fruit used widely in Jamaican cuisine.
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Division (GAPD) of GK Foods and Services Ltd (GKFS), a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of the Food Division of the Grace Kennedy Group (GK) of companies.
Over a period of almost a century, GK has evolved from a small mercantile 
firm founded in 1922 into an international food and financial services con-
glomerate with companies located in Jamaica, elsewhere in the Caribbean 
region, North America and Europe. Food processing and distribution current-
ly account for about two-thirds of the group’s revenue with the remainder 
deriving from a set of banking and finance companies, insurance and re-
mittance services, and an investment in the marketing of building materials. 
Central to GK’s global food distribution strategy is the ‘Grace’ brand which 
has strong recognition amongst the Jamaican and other West Indian diaspo-
ra and allows GK to source a significant share of its product portfolio through 
co-packing agreements across the world. The Jamaican hot pepper value 
chain is a very small part of the GK’s total operations, accounting for only a 
fraction of one percent of the Group’s assets and gross income.21
3.2.2 Production
Habanero and Scotch Bonnet peppers have traditionally been grown in 
Jamaica on a small scale due to the labour-intensive nature of harvesting.
The Agro Grace Processors hot pepper value chain was established in 2009 
when GAPD first arranged for farms to produce hot peppers to be processed 
at Southern Fruits and Food Processors Ltd into pepper mash and then into 
Grace pepper sauce (see subsection 3.2.3, below). In 2012, when GADP’s new 
agri-processing plant in Hounslow was operational, 15 small and medium-sized 
farms in two localities were contracted by GAPD to grow peppers on a total of 
approximately 25 acres. The pepper plots on these farms ranged from 0.5-5.0 
acres, with an average of about two acres. In 2013, 25-35 farmers were growing 
a total of 50 acres of peppers for the company. To support this operation, GADP 
has assisted a farmer to establish a commercial seedling nursery by providing 
him with technical agronomic support and inputs with deferred payment.
The contracts between farmers and GAPD provide for:
21  Data are not readily available for direct verification of this statement. However, the small size of 
GK’s pepper operation compared with the activities of the whole group are evident from the fact 
that GAPD spent only JA$80 million on the purchasing of peppers in 2012 compared with total GK 
Group revenues of JA$64 billion. GADP investment to equip and establish its pepper mash plant 
was JA$43 million compared with 2012 GK Group assets of JA$ 106 billion (Source of GK Group 
data: GK Group Annual Report 2012.) Note that the small share of its pepper operations is in part 
due to GK’s co-packing arrangements with processors in Jamaica, Belize and the UK which ship 
branded product directly to the market.
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• the supply of inputs from Agro Grace farm and gardening supply branches 
at discounted prices and with deferred payment
• a requirement that the farmer has access to water and has installed drip 
irrigation
• technical assistance with the help of the Rural Agricultural Development 
Authority (RADA)
• the quantities to be delivered
• clear production/delivery schedules
• a pre-set producer price
• procurement standards that cover ripeness, grades, and maximum 
pesticide levels.
GADP pays the same producer prices as other buyers, adjusting them every 
14 months. Payments are made directly to farmers’ accounts usually within 
one or two weeks of delivery. Contracts are generally honoured, with a low-
level of side-selling.
3.2.3 Processing
Prior to manufacturing into finished sauces and other products ready for 
bottling or packing, freshly harvested peppers are processed into hot pepper 
mash. This involves mechanical crushing of the peppers, the addition of salt 
and a period of fermentation in closed containers. The resulting hot pepper 
is storable and can be traded internationally prior to its use in the making of 
hot pepper sauces and other products
Until 2011, GK processed its pepper, jerk and condiment end products 
through an evolving series of supply chain arrangements. In the 1990s, it 
began to make these products at the processing plant of a long-established 
specialised Jamaican spice processor, Gray’s Pepper Products Ltd (GPPL). 
GPPL managed the supply of fresh peppers to the plant, buying them without 
contracts from Jamaican small-scale farmers, many of whom had long-
standing relationships with the company. GPPL converted these peppers 
into mash which it then transformed into GK packed/bottled and labelled 
products according to GK’s specifications.
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In the mid 2000s, a combination of hurricanes and droughts reduced national 
pepper production, forcing GK to import pepper mash from Costa Rica for 
the co-packers manufacturing GK products. This continued until 2008, when 
GK Group subsidiary GK Food Services Ltd. entered into a contract with the 
Jamaican firm Southern Fruits and Food Processors Ltd for the supply of mash 
based on Caribbean pepper varieties which have taste profiles more suited 
to consumer demand.
In 2011 GAPD commissioned its own post-harvest and packaging plant in 
Hounslow in the south-west of Jamaica to pack pre-cut vegetables and 
tubers. This was housed together with a newly established plant for processing 
hot pepper mash. These facilities are located in a building provided by the 
government on a 10-year lease, positioned amidst 3,500 acres of fertile land 
with irrigation facilities.22 The mash plant has the capacity to crush 40,000lbs of 
peppers per week, roughly half the capacity of GPPL’s plant. In 2012 this plant 
operated at only 20% of capacity. Its utilisation is projected to increase to 40% 
of capacity in 2013, as GAPD contracts additional growers of hot pepper.
Hot pepper sauces are made by adding vinegar to the mash together with a 
range of other ingredients which give individual brands their unique taste. Mash 
from GADP’s plant continues to be processed into GK labelled finished products 
through co-packing arrangements with other Jamaican firms, which include 
GPPL, Southern Fruits and two other food processing firms, King Pepper and Spur 
Tree, each of which also produces its own pepper products under manufactur-
ers’ brands as well as distributors’ brands owned by its customers. 
In 2007, GK acquired Enco Products Ltd, a UK company specialising in 
supplying the UK Caribbean food market which currently has four of the UK’s 
top five Caribbean brands of hot sauce in its product portfolio. GK exports 
pepper mash produced by GAPD to Enco to be used in the manufacture of 
these hot sauces. GK’s acquisition of Enco Products reflected its approach 
to expansion, which is to enter new country markets through local distributors 
and then, as the local market grows, take a view on strategic acquisitions.
3.2.4 Marketing
In addition to using its hot pepper mash for the manufacture of its 
own products in Jamaica and the UK, GAPD sells its mash to the four 
22  Construction of this building was financed under the Improving Jamaica’s Agricultural Productivity 
programme (IJAP). The IJAP is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
in partnership with the Government of Jamaica and the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation 
on Agriculture (IICA).
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abovementioned Jamaican processing companies and also supplies a 
processing company in the Caribbean island of St. Lucia.
GK pepper products made in Jamaica are sold domestically through 
wholesalers and directly to large-scale retailers. GK distributes the Grace 
brand and GK-owned brands including pepper-based products, to its 
principals in over 40 countries. In Jamaica, Canada, Belize and the United 
Kingdom it sells through its subsidiaries located in these countries. In the 
rest of the world, its products are marketed by its subsidiary Grace Foods 
International and sold through its network of independent distributors.
Foreign demand for GK’s products has traditionally been centred on the 
Jamaican diaspora and the diaspora of other Caribbean islands, but is 
progressively extending into mainstream markets, where it faces competition 
from global brands, such as Heinz and McCormick, which are expanding their 
product lines into jerk and items seasoned with hot pepper.
3.3  Innovative and interesting features
3.3.1 Value chain governance by the GK Group
The GK group: 
• obtains its basic raw material through contracting and organising a set of 
hot pepper growers
• processes hot peppers into mash at its Jamaican processing plant
• contracts Jamaican packers to manufacture and pack its products
• manufactures and distributes a set of own-brand hot pepper products at a 
plant in the UK and
• distributes own-branded products made in Jamaica within the domestic 
and export markets.
Thus, its involvement in the value chain is exceptionally comprehensive, span-
ning its full length, from cooperating with the Caribbean Agricultural and 
Research Development Institute (CARDI) in the supply of pepper seed with 
taste profiles required by customers through to retailing final products at its 
own supermarkets in Jamaica and distributing through wholesalers in over-
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seas markets. Its establishment of a pepper mash processing capacity and 
its associated contracting of pepper growers means that GK management is 
now in a position to plan and integrate activities at all stages of the chain. A 
high level of information flows along the chain in both directions and increas-
ingly efforts are being made to align the chain to meet market requirements. 
GK coordinates and seeks to improve the competitiveness of the chain at a 
set of different levels and using different means:
• The volume, characteristics and timing of peppers entering the chain are 
affected by the relationship it maintains with CARDI, GAPD support for 
breeding, its technical advice to farmers, and the set of provisions in its 
supply contracts with them.
• It holds quarterly meetings with all its contract farmers and attends farmer 
cooperative society meetings when issues arise relating to pepper and 
fresh cut vegetables.
• It has a long history of working with co-packers of pepper products to 
coordinate and plan their activities in line with its needs.
• Finally, through its board of directors, it is able to communicate with 
other units of the GK group which supply the value chain with market 
information, inputs and finance. 
3.3.2 The ability of the GK Group to take on a risky processing activity
GK’s decision to establish its own pepper mash production capacity in 
Jamaica was necessarily risky, given the seasonality of domestic production, 
Jamaica’s history of unstable annual pepper production, and the need to 
find a market for output in excess of that needed for the domestic production 
of its own GK-branded pepper products. The large size of the GK Group 
meant that it had the capacity both to reduce the size of the risk involved 
and to bear the risk that remained.
GK’s other activities in Jamaica meant that it also had an advantage over 
smaller, single activity companies in that it had the necessary experience 
and a pre-established capacity to take measures to reduce the risk of raw 
material supply failure. The foundation for this was GAPD’s prior experience of 
the contract farming of other crops, which allowed it to successfully contract 
a set of farmers to grow and deliver peppers in such a manner as to assure 
a steady supply of high quality fresh peppers to the plant (see sub-section 
3.2.2, above). The likelihood of default by farmers was minimised through 
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contractual provisions relating to input supply, the timely delivery of extension 
advice and input supplies, and prompt payment, each of which was backed 
by the GK Group’s financial strength and facilitated by a delivery capacity 
based on its pre-existing activities in Jamaica.
GK’s established position within the Jamaican economy and its strong 
domestic marketing capacity also meant that the government turned to it 
as the most suitable enterprise to which to lease the large building complex 
that now houses both its hot pepper mash processing plant and facilities for 
packing fresh produce. Being able to lease rather than needing to purchase 
such a facility further reduced the amount of capital GK needed to invest in 
the venture, thereby reducing further the risk involved.
The large and diversified nature of the GK group’s activities meant that 
the total cost of the venture was small compared with the group’s total 
assets and that the success or otherwise of the venture was unlikely to be 
systematically correlated with the financial performance of the group as a 
whole. Thus, although the venture of itself carried a certain amount of risk, 
it did not represent a significant risk for the group. In the event, the mash 
processing plant has yet to work at more than a fraction of its rated capacity 
and, in the short-term until capacity increases, this may place a small 
financial burden on the group.
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Jamaica 
The Jamaica Egg Farmers Association/ 
Caribbean Egg Processors Value Chain4
4.1 National context
Sub-section 3.1, above, contains a short description of the physical and socio-
economic characteristics of Jamaica.
In the first half of the last decade, Jamaican egg consumption per capita 
was low by international standards23 and the domestic production of fresh 
eggs was facing increasing competition from imports of processed liquid 
and dried egg products. These were preferred by the hospitality and agro-
processing sectors which considered them both safer and more convenient.
4.2  Jamaica Egg Farmers Association/Caribbean 
Egg Processors value chain
4.2.1 Value chain definition and scale
This case study refers to eggs produced by the 50 members of the Jamaica 
Egg Farmers Association (JEFA), which are sold fresh or processed within 
Jamaica, with very small amounts exported fresh to CARICOM countries.
4.2.2 Production
Currently, some 132 million eggs are produced commercially each year in 
Jamaica by 500 farmers. Members of the Jamaica Egg Farmers Association 
(JEFA) account for about three-quarters of this output. JEFA, which was 
formed in 1998 and now has in excess of 50 members, is registered as a not-
for-profit limited liability company. The remaining 25% of national egg output 
is produced by over 400 small and medium-sized backyard farmers and a few 
large-scale farmers who are not members of JEFA.24 Most of these small and 
medium farmers contribute to JEFA revenue through service fees levied at the 
point of sale of inputs and, in turn, benefit from services provided by JEFA.25 
23  Eggs accounted for some 0.3%, 0.9% and 0.7% of the human consumption of, respectively, calories, 
protein and fats, and only 1.6-1.7% of the calories, protein and fats provided by livestock products. 
See: FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/index.html#DOWNLOAD
24  Many other households also keep poultry to produce eggs for home consumption and informal 
sale.
25  Jamaica’s large integrated poultry companies own two feed mills and two hatcheries, a part 
of the output of which is sold to commercial poultry farmers and feed depots (which on-sell to 
backyard and small-scale farmers). A service fee is added to the price of each sale and passed on 
to JEFA. In addition to their wish to promote rural development in Jamaica, this support of small pro-
ducers by large operations makes commercial sense because small producers account for some 
20% of the sales of their input supply operations. 
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4.2.3 Processing
In 2004, to counter the downward trend in demand for domestically pro-
duced eggs, around ten members of JEFA, with co-funding from the Jamaica 
Business Development Corporation (JBDC), developed a plan to commence 
egg processing in Jamaica. In the same year, these members invested in an 
egg inspection, grading and storage unit using finance provided under the 
Jamaica Business Recovery Programme (JBRP).26 This unit is located in Kitson 
Town, some 20 km to the West of the national capital, Kingston, and com-
prises an egg grading machine and a 40-foot refrigerated reefer container. 
The latter facilitates the receiving, grading, packaging and shipping of eggs 
and also provides additional storage capacity at times of surplus. The main 
purpose of the unit was to handle and assure the quality of the output of the 
ten farmers, who had a total of some 45,000 layer hens producing 4.6 million 
eggs annually.27 The group of ten farmers runs the packhouse and also ac-
cepts eggs from other nearby farmers. On delivery, eggs are graded using the 
Jamaica Egg Standards, which JEFA played a key role in developing together 
with the Bureau of Standards Jamaica (BSJ). JEFA has also played a pivotal 
role in establishing the CARICOM Table Egg Standards.
In 2007, with strong support from JEFA, 30 members of the association took the 
initiative to establish an egg processing company, Caribbean Egg Processors 
Limited (CEP), as a joint venture with Caribbean Producers Jamaica Limited 
(CPJL).
CPJL was founded in 1994 to service the hospitality industry as an integrated 
food service distributor. It has subsequently added a merchandising service 
for the retail trade and now has its own branded ranges of fruit juice and 
dairy, meat and seafood products, which it processes and packs at its 
Montego Bay Freeport complex.
CEP is owned equally by CPJL and Liquid Eggs Limited (LEL), a company 
established by the 30 JEFA members for this purpose.28 The CEP Board is 
chaired by JEFA and comprises representatives of JEFA (farming), CPJL 
(marketing), CEP (processing), and large private agro-processors (input 
supplies and services). This wide membership provides a platform for dialogue 
on means of improving the competitiveness of the domestic egg industry and 
26  The JBRP was a one-year USAID-funded vehicle for providing technical assistance, training and 
grants to assist the recovery of producers in the horticulture, poultry, fishing and craft manufactur-
ing sectors, which were devastated by Hurricane Ivan.
27  See the 18 December 2005 report by the Jamaica Information Service. http://www.jis.gov.jm/news/
archive/7633-agriculture-egg-farmers-in-kitson-town-get-storage-unit.
28  JEFA, itself, did not invest in LEL.
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of furthering the development of an efficient egg processing sector able to 
compete effectively with imports.
CEP has a US$500,000 fully automated processing plant at Montego Bay. It 
purchases the eggs which it processes through the JEFA packhouse, primarily 
from the farmers who have shares in the company. When there is a shortfall 
from these shareholders, the packhouse provides eggs from other suppliers, 
including small farmers.
The plant initially produced food-service packed pasteurised liquefied whole 
eggs, egg whites and egg yolk. Pasteurisation takes place within a HACCP-
standard environment to reduce the risk of contamination prior to packing 
into 1.8 litre containers. All CEP products are subjected to batch-by-batch 
testing. Liquefied eggs are preferred by the hospitality, food service and 
commercial food industry since they eliminate the need to crack eggshells 
in a busy commercial environment, aid hygiene during food preparation, 
and have a shelf life of 30-45 days when stored at the recommended 
temperature of 0-5 Celsius.
Once established, CEP rapidly captured 60% of the hospitality market. In 2012, 
to dilute its dependence on this market which is subject to the vagaries of 
the tourist industry, CEP extended its product line into 720 ml retail-packed 
liquid eggs for the supermarket trade. In October 2013, it also commenced 
delivering liquid eggs to Nutrition Products Limited, the contractor for the 
Ministry of Education’s school feeding programme. These will replace 
imported butter oil in the production of nutri-buns, both saving foreign 
exchange and improving the nutritional content of the buns.
CEP had a gross revenue of US$400,000 in 2011. It employs eight staff, 
including a manager and laboratory technician. Although CEP sales have 
grown, it has yet to operate at above 50% of its capacity to liquefy 18,000 
eggs per hour. 
4.2.4 Marketing
Fresh eggs are sold by the packhouse to CEP and to food retailers. Processed 
CEP products are sold by CPJL to hospitality and food service firms and are 
retailed through CPJL’s outlets and supermarkets. 
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4.3 Innovative and interesting features
4.3.1  Market expansion through import substitution based on adding 
value
JEFA faced the problem of expanding its members’ sales of eggs in the face 
of stagnant domestic demand and growing competition from processed 
egg imports. Rather than simply promoting domestic demand for fresh in-
shell eggs, JEFA members decided to add value to its members’ output 
and compete with processed imports. It did this by first investing in an egg 
grading, packaging and storage facility to strengthen the supply chain for 
fresh eggs and followed this up by investing in a liquid egg processing plant, 
the only such plant in the Caribbean.
 JEFA and it members have achieved the following:
• formed a new company (LEL) as a basis for a joint venture (CEP) with a 
well-established company (CPJL) that was perfectly placed to successfully 
market liquid eggs through its existing food distribution network
• ensured that the Board of CEP is chaired by JEFA
• worked with CPJL to successfully establish a liquid egg processing facility 
and market its output
• generated the following benefits for Jamaica:
 { expanded the market for domestically produced eggs and reduced 
foreign exchange expenditure on imported processed eggs
 { improved the national balance of payments and increased domestic 
value added and employment
 { further improved the national balance of payments and improved child 
nutrition by enabling imported butter oil to be replaced with liquid 
eggs in nutri-buns distributed through the school feeding programme
 { reduced through pasteurisation the risk of salmonella infection.
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Haiti 
The JMB SA Mango Value Chain5
5.1 National context
5.1.1 Haiti’s physical and socio-economic characteristics
Haiti occupies 36% of the land area of Hispaniola, the second largest 
Caribbean island. It lies about 100km south-east of the largest Caribbean 
island, Cuba. The capital, Port-au-Prince, is some 1,200km south-east of Miami. 
Haiti is bordered in the east by the Dominican Republic, which occupies 
the remainder of Hispaniola. Haiti’s largely mountainous terrain has been 
subjected to widespread deforestation and is heavily eroded. The country’s 
population of 10.1 million is the second largest in the Caribbean (after 
the 11.2 million of Cuba), and is much larger than that of any of the other 
Caribbean-Pacific case-study countries. 
Haiti is the poorest country in the Americas and by far the poorest of the 
case-study countries. It suffered a severe earthquake in 2010, which killed 
over 200,000 people and caused major damage to the nation’s infrastructure. 
There are large Haitian diaspora in the Dominican Republic, the USA, France, 
Canada, and the Bahamas. It is thought that in total there are about 2 million 
Haitians living abroad. 
The main foodstuffs produced domestically are starchy roots, pulses, fruits and 
vegetables. Almost half of the calories and proteins in the national diet are 
derived from cereals, of which over half comprises imported wheat and rice. 
Haiti’s three main agricultural exports are essential oils, cocoa and mangoes/
mangosteens/guavas.
5.1.2 Haitian mango production and exports
Mangoes are the main fruit produced in Haiti. A total of about 140 varieties 
are grown nationally. Mangoes were traditionally grown in the West, Artibo-
nite and Central Departments and more recently in the South and South-East 
Departments. This regional spread and Haiti’s diverse micro-climates enable 
mangoes to be harvested nationally for over 11 months of the year, com-
pared with 5 months in Mexico and just 8-12 weeks in many producing coun-
tries. The long harvest season allows Haiti to export mangoes during seasonal 
peaks in international prices when there is little supply from other sources.29 
29  Producers, with support from the Government and exporters, aim to maximise output during high 
price seasons through variety selection and changes in cultural practices, such as modified pruning 
and subjecting trees to water stress. 
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The majority of the country’s output is grown on small farms where mango 
trees are scattered amongst food crops. These farms use little or no chemical 
inputs. There is a small but emerging set of growers with mango orchards of 
between 2 and 10 hectares. These tend to employ more advanced cultural 
methods that include pruning and the use of the recommended spacing 
of trees. Haiti’s large population means that the majority of national mango 
output is consumed domestically. 
In 2007, the US Government banned the importation of Haitian mangoes 
following the discovery of fruit flies in shipments. The reopening of the market 
was contingent on the implementation of a detection and control program 
in producing areas and the heat treatment of the fruits prior to export.
Currently, Haiti exports approximately two million 10lb boxes (approximately 
10,000 tons).  ‘Madame Francique’ is the sole variety which can currently 
be exported to the United States because, unlike other varieties, its quality 
is unaffected by heat treatment.30 Madame Francique comprises about 15 
percent of national mango production, of which some 25 to 33 percent is 
exported. In the US market, these mangoes earn up to a 50 % premium over 
their major competitor, the Ataulfo variety from Chiapas, Mexico. Some 2% of 
Haiti’s mango exports are currently certified as organic.
5.2 The JMB S.A. mango value chain
5.2.1 Value chain definition and scale
This case study refers to mangoes that are exported in fresh or processed 
form by a single enterprise, JMB S.A. It is one of the largest Haitian exporters 
of fresh mangoes and other tropical fruits and vegetables to North America. 
Its annual fresh mango exports to the USA currently amount to some 450,000 
10lb boxes (approximately 2,000 tons), equivalent to about one fifth of annual 
national mango exports.
5.2.2 Production
JMB obtains its mangoes from three sources:
• approximately 50 small estates, which deliver directly to JMB
30  The Madame Francique variety is known by different names, including Francis and Mango Fransci-
que.
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• approximately 250 small-scale farms which belong to farmer associations 
which are members of the Associations of Fruit Producers and Sellers from 
the South (ASPVEFS) and which use their association to harvest and market 
their mangoes
• approximately 200 small-scale farms which sell their produce to collectors 
(voltigeurs).
All three sources deliver to the JMB packhouse and to other exporters. Most 
of the small-scale farmers have less than 2.0 ha, often with fewer than 10 
trees scattered amongst food crops.
5.2.3 Harvesting and primary marketing
Some fifteen voltigeurs deliver to JMB. They buy the crop from farmers 
through a network of collectors. The crop is bought while still on the tree, with 
the collectors undertaking the harvest. Collectors harvest all mangoes at 
one time, both ripe and unripe. The farmer is paid only for fruits considered 
acceptable to the voltigeurs. After these are selected, immature, over 
ripe, bruised and fly-infested fruits are left on the farm. These have little 
commercial value and, at best, can only be sold by the farmer to small-
scale traders for local consumption at very low prices. The voltigeurs typically 
provide loans to farmers year-round. This relationship invariably results in 
voltigeurs paying indebted farmers less than the ruling market price
ASPVEFS, an agglomeration of small mango-grower associations, was 
established in cooperation with JMB to provide farmers with an alternative to 
selling to voltigeurs. In 2008, its membership comprised 750 small-scale mango 
farmers from four localities in southern Haiti.
The Association is supported by two NGOs, the Organisation for the 
Rehabilitation of the Environment (ORE) and Agronomes and Veterinaires 
Sans Frontier. The association’s coverage is relatively small, with the mango 
output of its members amounting to 120,000 fruits. This compares with an 
output of over 12 million fruits on Haiti’s Central Plateau.31
The main role of ASPVEFS is to organise and undertake all activities from 
harvesting fruit from the tree through to sale to exporters and small-scale 
domestic buyers. The association buys mango directly from farmers aiming to 
31  CRS/CIRAT, Assessment of Haitian Mango Value Chain, 2011.
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pay a stable price using standardised methods of acquisition. Once a farmer 
makes an agreement with ASPVEFS to sell his/her mangoes, the association 
uses its harvesting team to carefully select ripe mangoes, pick them, pack 
them into plastic crates and transport them to its conditioning centre, where 
they are washed and sorted into two grades - those suitable for export in 
fresh form and second class undergrades that are malformed, bruised or 
have blemished skins. The former are sold to the exporter JMB S.A., with which 
ASPVEFS has been dealing for over 10 years. Unlike supplies that have been 
picked and delivered by collectors, for which rejects can reach 50%, JMB 
rejects very few of the association’s mangoes, which have been carefully 
selected during picking and subsequently sorted at its conditioning centre. 
Second class mangoes that do not meet the size and shape requirements 
of the fresh fruit export market are sold in fresh form for retailing domestically 
or dried by slow hydration at a processing facility financed by the EU and 
operated by ORE. After packaging, dried mangoes are sold locally and in 
Port-au-Prince. In 2008, ASPVEFS sold an estimated 38% of its purchases to JMB 
S.A for export, 21% to ORE for drying, and 41% to traders for fresh consumption 
in the domestic market.
ASPVEFS has been certified as a Fairtrade FLO-CERT Gmbh producer and has 
embarked on the process of obtaining organic certification for its members’ 
production and for its packing facility. Both will allow its members to obtain 
premium prices for their crop in the North American market. This, coupled with 
the well-organised, efficient picking, handling and processing undertaken by 
their association results in members obtaining farm-gate prices well in excess 
of those paid by voltigeurs.32 ASPVEFS has attempted to sell to a number of 
exporters but has only developed a satisfactory and productive relationship 
with JMB.
5.2.4 Processing and exporting 
JMB was established in 1983 to pack vegetables and fruit, including mangoes, 
for export. In 1986, it established a hot water treatment (HWT) facility for treat-
ing fresh mangoes prior to export to eliminate fruit flies. This technique was de-
veloped by a consortium of mango exporters, the Haitian Ministry of Agricul-
ture and specialists from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). The facility 
subsequently established by JMB was the first in the northern hemisphere. In 
2011, ten packing facilities in Haiti had APHIS-approved HWT facilities.33
32  CRS/CIRAT, Op Cit.
33  http://haiti.usembassy.gov/offices/offices-and-department.html
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By the mid-2000s, JMB was one of ten major exporters of Haitian mangoes. It 
currently has a large treatment and packing plant in Port-au-Prince covering 
23,000 sq ft. This currently employs over 50 full-time and 100 part-time workers. 
All JMB mango exports are to the USA. Following the 2007 banning of Haitian 
mango imports into the USA, JMB participated in a partnership with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, USDA/APHIS and the National Association of Mango 
Exporters (ANEM) to establish a detection and control programme in 
producing areas. All shipments to the USA are now subject to a Haiti Mango 
Preclearance Program run by the National Association of Mango Exporters.34
In 2010, with the assistance of a debt and equity investment of US$2.3 million 
by the George Soros Fund, JMB invested in an IQF facility to quick freeze 
individual pieces of mangoes, including diced and halved fruits and chunks. 
This facility uses fruits that are unsuitable to export in fresh form, converting 
them into a high-value exportable product. In addition to generating 
additional income for JMB, the facility reduces the quantity of rejected fruits 
for which the only alternative is sale on the domestic market at very low 
prices. Thus, JMB’s pioneering investments in new processing technology 
have both raised the mean price of its mango exports and increased the 
percentage of farm production that can be exported.
JMB packs mangoes with both its own brand labelling and third-party 
labelling for customers of long standing. By working closely with NGOs and 
their programmes in Haiti and with USDA/APHIS it has skilfully carved out a 
market niche in the USA, positioning its brands around natural production, 
organic and fairtrade themes. Its exports to the USA include USDA/APHIS 
and BCS Oko Garantie GmbH certified products. 35 It works closely on 
the development and exploitation of this positioning with one of its main 
customers, the up-market US Whole Foods retail chain, which also promotes 
its products around green and fairtrade themes. Whole Foods, as part of its 
market positioning strategy, supports conservation programmes in Haiti.
5.2.5 Other JMB initiatives and support
JMB has helped further increase the efficiency of the domestic mango sector by:
34  APHIS provides training but the facilities and inspectors are financed by exporters. http://haiti.
usembassy.gov/press-releases-2012/press-release-mangoes.html
35  USDA/APHIS is the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the United States Department 
of Agriculture. BCS Oko Garantie GmbH is a long-established German private controlling agency 
which specialises in organic certification.
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• establishing three post-harvest collection centres to reduce post-harvest 
losses and serve as post-harvest training facilities for farmers (together with 
USAID and the aid organisation, CHF International)
• training farmers to increase tree populations and productivity per tree and 
to improve the impact of mango farming on the environment 
• training farmers, together with the Organisation for the Rehabilitation of 
the Environment (ORE), to propagate improved seeds, promote high value 
fruit tree grafting and soil conservation techniques, upgrade low-quality 
trees, and encourage tree infilling
• importing and testing numerous new mango varieties and establishing 
nurseries for Madame Francique seedlings 
• promoting drip irrigation, including for new smallholder plantations;
• working with mango producers to adapt means of transport to local 
conditions (e.g. crate holders for donkeys), to improve temporary 
processing and selection centres (using appropriate technologies), and to 
establish fruit conditioning centres.
5.3 Innovative and interesting features
5.3.1 Driving a supply chain without vertical integration
JMB is an good example of how a commercial company can drive the 
development of a value chain without extending its ownership beyond 
a single stage of the chain. The improvements in the value chain that 
supplies mangoes to JMB have all been achieved without JMB becoming 
commercially involved in the stages of the chain that have been improved. 
This is largely due to JMB’s demonstrated efficiency, commercial effectiveness, 
ability to innovate and capacity to attract sought after venture capital, 
which, in turn, has led to donors and NGOs aspiring to be associated with it 
through support of upstream activities.
5.3.2  The key role that final processors for export play in value-chain 
development
Firms engaged in final processing for export must:
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• be well-informed on demand in importing countries, including the demand 
for differently processed and packaged products, quality specifications, 
seasonal price patterns and the price premiums commanded by products 
certified as organic, environmentally friendly and fairtrade
• have the production and marketing expertise to meet market demand
• have reliable access at the lowest possible unit costs to domestically 
produced commodities suitable for meeting these demand. 
JMB has demonstrated how its efforts to meet these conditions have given it 
the motivation and capacity to drive the development of the Haitian Mango 
chain through: 
• upstream support for environmentally friendly and fairtrade production, 
increased domestic output of high quality mangoes, and improved post-
harvest technologies
• widening of its product range to add value to fresh mangoes
• investment in IQF processing capacity
• downstream opening up and development of markets for natural, wild, 
organic and fairtrade mango products. 
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The Taveuni Taro Export Value Chain1
1.1 Context
1.1.1 Fiji’s physical and socio-economic characteristics
Fiji is located about 1,000 km to the east of Vanuatu and roughly the same 
distance to the southwest of Samoa. The nearest developed country port is 
Auckland, New Zealand, some 2,500 km to the south. Fiji comprises two main 
islands Vanua Levu and Viti Levu. Suva, the national capital and the country’s 
main port, is located on Viti Levu. Fiji has a large number of smaller islands, 
the largest of which are Taveuni (which falls within the Northern Division) and 
Kadavu (Eastern Division). Fiji’s land resources are a little greater than those 
of the most comparable Caribbean case-study country, Jamaica. Its total 
land and arable areas are, respectively, 66% and 39% larger. However, its 
population is less than one third that of Jamaica.
Fiji’s main crop is sugarcane. The main staple foodstuffs are root crops and 
imported wheat flour and rice. Almost 60% of the calorie requirements of 
Fijian households are met by imported food.
Fiji has the highest per capita income of the three Pacific island countries 
(PICs) covered by this study, estimated at US$4,438 in 2012. This is similar to 
that of Belize and a little below that of Jamaica.
1.1.2 Taro cultivation and varieties
Taro is a tropical root crop which requires humid growing conditions. The 
majority of varieties do not tolerate drought. Most of the world’s taro is grown 
in West Africa and China. The PICs account for about 4% of world output. In 
the PICs, it is an important food crop, accounting for a higher contribution to 
dietary calories than in any other region in the world. 
Taro is propagated vegetatively. It can be grown either on flooded land or 
under upland conditions. Its leaves can be eaten, but it is grown principally 
for its corm, which is harvested 7-10 months after planting. The dasheen type 
(Colocasia esculenta) grown in Fiji and the rest of the region has a single 
large central corm. These have a short post-harvest storage life at ambient 
temperatures of no more than a week and of about 3-4 weeks when chilled.
A range of taro varieties are grown in Fiji. The bulk of exports comprises 
the pink-fleshed Tausala ni Samoa variety which is similar to the traditional 
Samoan cultivar (Taro Niue) favoured by the Samoan diaspora worldwide.
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1.2 The Fij i  taro export value chain
1.2.1 Value chain definition and scale
This case study refers to taro grown on the island of Taveuni, which in 2010 
accounted for some 70% of the total weight of Fijian taro exports. A total 
of some 17,000 people are directly or indirectly dependent on taro for their 
livelihood, equal to about one fifth of the island’s population and 2% of the 
total population of Fiji.
1.2.2 Production
In Fiji, taro is grown entirely in pure stand under upland (non-flooded) 
conditions in the country’s wetter areas where rainfall exceeds 2500 mm.
The harvesting of taro requires loosening of the soil prior to the lifting of each 
individual plant by hand. After removing the leaves, the corm is sorted and 
cleaned of soil prior to home consumption or sale. 
Until 20 years ago, taro was principally grown for home consumption and 
sale in local markets. This changed dramatically in 1993 when the Samoan 
industry was decimated by taro leaf blight (TLB), suddenly opening up the 
New Zealand taro market to exports from Fiji. Taveuni, which is free of taro 
beetle (Papuana uninodis) and has rich volcanic soils well suited to the 
growing of the colocasia variety, rapidly established itself as Fiji’s main source 
of taro exports. This was solely the result of the initiative of Taveuni’s farmers, 
responding to the sudden increase in demand from exporters.
Most of Taveuni’s taro farmers - some 2,000 - fall into the semi-subsistence 
category, growing 5,000 -15,000 plants each. There are about 750 taro farmers 
who are fully commercial. The remainder of Fiji’s taro exports are grown in 
high rainfall areas on Viti Levu that are located in close proximity to the port 
at Suva. The high post-1993 profits stemming from taro growing for export 
resulted in transformation of the island’s largely subsistence, garden-based 
cropping systems into intensive monoculture of taro employing high levels of 
chemical fertilisers on existing crop land and on newly cleared forest land.
The constant search for new land on which to grow the crop has led to 
Taveuni having the highest rate of deforestation in Fiji. A substantial part of 
the crop is now being grown on unsuitably steep slopes, leading to heavy soil 
erosion. On existing farms, the high intensity of production has damaged the 
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structure and reduced the nutrient content of the soil, resulting in a significant 
fall in per-hectare yields and an increase in the percentage of corms that are 
too small to export.
This fall in land productivity, coupled with a squeeze on gross margins and 
difficulties with market access has meant that, after a period of strong growth, 
exports from Taveuni have been in decline in recent years (Figure 2). A 
response to these problems is now underway.
Source: Rohit Lal, Agricultural Officer, Taveuni.
Two Taveuni-based growers’ organisations, Teitei Taveuni and Marist Tutu 
Rural Training Centre, are spearheading efforts to reverse the decline in 
productivity through the adoption of sustainable farming practices. These 
efforts are being supported by technical and financial inputs from a set of 
outside entities, including ACIAR, OMF, AusAID, Caritas Australia, SPC, UNDP, 
and the Fiji Ministry of Agriculture.
1.2.3 Marketing and exporting
Taro destined for the export market is purchased directly from farmers by 
agents of exporters, either at the farm gate or the agent’s store. Agents com-
pete for supplies on the basis of price and by being first at the farm gate with 
cash. It is largely a free-for-all market, although a few of the larger growers 
remain loyal to particular agents and exporters. In the past, exporters often 
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provided finance to farmers. However, this practice has largely ceased due to 
exporters incurring losses as a result of farmers side-selling to buyers to whom 
they were not indebted. At its peak in the late 1990s, there were 12 taro ex-
porters supported by 30 agents and sub-agents operating in Taveuni alone. 
Following a shakeout about half these numbers are currently operating.
The taro marketing system is well supported by a good supply of carriers, 
trucks and shipping to Suva. The development of Taveuni’s commercial 
taro industry coincided with the introduction of “roll-on roll-off” (RoRo) 
shipping services. There is also more than adequate sea freight capacity to 
international markets from the Suva and Lautoka ports.
The Taveuni agents have packing facilities, mostly located at the wharf near 
the ferry terminal at Wairiki, where they sort the taro, pack it in polybags and 
load the bags onto 10-ton trucks ready for transport on a RoRo ferry to Suva-
based exporters. The distance between Waruki and Suva is some 250km. In 
Suva, exporters re-grade and wash the taro and then pack it for export into a 
reefer container, where the temperature is maintained at 6-8oC.  
Some 65% of Fijian taro exports currently go to New Zealand by sea and 
a further 30% to Australia by air, with small amounts shipped to the USA 
(principally Hawaii) and other destinations. 
The main taro consumers in export markets are former Pacific islanders, with 
the Samoan community being the dominant consumer group. According to 
the 2006 population census, New Zealand’s Samoan diaspora was 131,000. 
This represented 47% of New Zealand’s Pacific island population and around 
7% of its total population. Cook Islanders, Niueans, Fijians and Tongans also 
have a strong preference for taro. In 2006, their New Zealand-based diaspora 
had a combined population of 141,000.36
Fiji’s highly competitive root-crop marketing system has provided Taveuni 
farmers with attractive prices, at least in the short term. The competitiveness 
of the system is reflected in the relatively narrow marketing margins of 
exporters and traders. While the highly competitive marketing system has 
served root crop growers well in terms of maximising farm-gate prices, there 
remains a degree of market failure in terms of produce quality.
36  Pacific Island Taro Market Access Scoping Study, Facilitating Agricultural Commodity Trade Project, 
March 2011.
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1.3 Innovative and interesting features
1.3.1 Climate change and the security of production
The taro variety, Tausala ni Samoa, being exported from Taveuni is genetically 
similar to the Samoan variety that was decimated by TLB in 1993. The incidence 
of TLB and taro’s susceptibility to it are positively correlated with night time 
temperature. TLB has yet to be detected in Fiji, which is further from the Equator 
than Samoa and has cooler nights. However, global warming means that there 
is a probability that TLB will become established in Taveuni with dire conse-
quences for its taro export industry.37
Over the long-term, the arrival of TLB in Fiji would seem inevitable. There was 
no real awareness of this in the Fiji taro industry or the Ministry of Agriculture 
until publication in 2011 of a report by the International Union for the Con-
servation of Nature.38 This recommended replicating Samoa’s successful taro 
breeding programme in Fiji. Such a programme is now starting to be under-
taken by the Research Division of the Ministry of Agriculture in collaboration 
with SPC’s Centre for Pacific Crops and Trees (CePaCT). Thus, both identifi-
cation of the problem and initiating a programme to address it took place 
outside the value chain. This is in contrast to the ongoing attempts to reverse 
the decline in taro yields in Taveuni, which were largely initiated and driven 
by growers. The difference in the two responses reflects the fact that small-
scale farmers have neither the time to consider, nor the ability to analyse, the 
complex implications of a phenomenon such as climate change. They will 
react to reverse practices that are leading to clearly visible damage but will 
not take steps to prevent or mitigate the impact of uncertain adverse events, 
the causation of which is difficult to understand and the timing of which can-
not be predicted.
1.3.2 Market access vulnerability
Australian is one of the two main markets for taro exported from Fiji and other 
Pacific islands. Australia also provides assistance to Fiji for measures that sup-
port the production of taro for export. Despite these two facts, it continues to 
impose quarantine barriers that hamper the importation of taro from Fiji and 
other Pacific islands. In particular, its protocol for Pacific islands’ taro imports 
37  Tausala ni Samoa is also grown elsewhere in Fiji. Other varieties grown in Fiji are also thought to be 
susceptible to TLB to some extent.
38  IUCN, Assessing the social and economic value of germplasm and crop improvement as a climate 
change adaptation strategy: Samoa and Vanuatu case studies, 2011.
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requires taro corms to be devitalised by removal of their growing points to 
prevent propagation in Australia. In addition to the cost of devitalisation, this 
procedure greatly increases the perishability of the product, increases the 
incidence of corm rot and, in effect, precludes the option of sea-freighting. 
The increased costs and losses have caused Fijian taro to be uncompetitive 
in the Australian market and are preventing market expansion.
In 2010, in response to a request from a group of Fijian taro exporters, the 
SPC/EU FACT project undertook a study of taro import protocols for the 
four main developed country markets for Pacific taro, namely Australia, 
New Zealand, the USA and Japan. In the case of Australia, the study found 
that (a) devitalisation is a major cause of the high level of corm rot that 
hampers Fijian exports to Australia, (b) Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu all have a 
well-documented favourable disease-free status for taro due to the absence 
of virus and fungal diseases, and (c) there is consequently a case for the 
three countries to be considered pest free/low prevalence areas under 
international SPS standards. The study noted that Australia’s disease-free 
status was significantly less well documented than in the main PIC producing 
countries and also that both the USA and Japan are significantly larger taro 
producers than Australia but do not require devitalisation. It further noted 
that, despite its small size, the Australian taro industry has vigorously lobbied 
the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service and local parliamentary 
representatives to impose tighter restrictions on taro imports.
The Australian government responded to this study with its own analysis of the 
situation, undertaken by Biosecurity Australia (BA), an arm of the Department 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. The resulting 230-page document, 
published in November 2011, recommended that the existing protocol stay 
essentially unchanged with the devitalisation requirements remaining in 
place. The main reported concern of BA was the presence of a virus and an 
insect in Fiji, which have not been reported in Australia. This virus does not 
affect taro production in Fiji, but in combination with the insect could, it is 
reported, lead to the spread of another damaging virus (which is not present 
in Fiji). While the transmission and interaction between insects and viruses is 
a complex issue that is often not well understood, it is most unlikely that taro 
commercially imported into Melbourne or Sydney to be consumed by the 
Samoan community would then be transported to the north of Queensland 
(the location of the Australian taro industry) to be used as planting material.
Measures to protect domestic producers are the most insurmountable market 
access barriers faced by small exporting countries. This example graphically 
illustrates the difficulty faced by such countries when attempting to export 
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to large nations that have similar domestic industries, regardless of how small 
these industries are. Regulators can readily hide behind ‘what if’ scenarios 
and, as demonstrated by Australia, are prepared to do so even when the 
exporting country is receiving related external assistance from donors and 
regional organisations.
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Fiji 
The National Papaya Export Value Chain2
2.1 National context
Sub-section B.1.1, above, contains a brief description of the physical and 
socio-economic characteristics of Fiji.
2.2 The Fij i  papaya export value chain
2.2.1 Value chain definition and scale
This case study refers to all papaya that are grown on Fiji for export in fresh 
form to New Zealand, including those that do not reach export grade and 
are sold in the domestic market. The chain is based on the output of some 
200 small-scale famers. Fiji’s record exports of 800 tons in 2011 were equal to 
some 0.3% of global papaya exports.  
The study is focused principally on quarantine treatment and exporting.
2.2.2 Production
The majority of the 200 papaya growers who produce for the export market 
are located in the Sigatoka Valley of Fiji’s main island, Viti Levu. 
Most of Fiji’s papaya is grown on a relatively small scale, with farmers typically 
planting around 0.1 ha of papaya mixed with other horticultural crops. There 
are two large-scale growers who export their own output plus additional 
amounts which they acquire from small-scale farmers.
Since 2008, Fiji’s papaya sector has been assisted by the donor-financed 
Fiji Papaya Project. This, inter alia, supports production and post-harvest 
handling through applied research across the supply chain. Farmers also 
receive support from MAF, Nature’s Way Cooperative (NWC, see below), the 
Taiwanese Technical Mission and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
(SPC).
Small-scale growers buy papaya seedlings raised from seed of the Solo 
Sunrise variety in nurseries run by private companies, Nature’s Way 
Cooperative, the Taiwanese Technical Mission and a government research 
station.39 Until recently, Solo Sunrise seed was acquired from the University of 
39   The resulting fruits are exported under the name Fiji Red Papaya, although not all exporters  
presently use branding.
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Hawaii Seed Laboratory. However, the availability and quality of seed from 
this source has declined and attempts are being made to establish domestic 
seed production under a certified scheme in the main growing areas. Farmers 
purchase fertiliser and other inputs from hardware stores. 
Fiji’s papaya production capacity is vulnerable to frequent damage from 
high winds and flooding. In December 2009, tropical cyclone Mick destroyed 
some 80% of the papaya crop. More recently, severe floods in January and 
March 2012 caused substantial damage to production capacity, destroying 
about 30 hectares and damaging other land planted to papaya. Tropical 
cyclone Evan inflicted further severe damage in December 2012, destroying 
30% of the standing crop and causing substantial defoliation in other areas.40 
The yields and quality of papaya are also affected by drought during El Nino 
years. Climate change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of 
damaging climatic events.
2.2.3 Internal marketing
There is a relatively large market for papaya in Fiji. The percentage of annual na-
tional production absorbed by this market is inversely correlated with the level of 
national production and varies markedly from year to year. In recent years, the 
percentage of annual production exported has ranged from 20–50%.
There are currently about nine papaya exporters, of which four account for the 
majority of national exports. There are frequent new entrants, most of who strug-
gle to survive due to the impact of natural disasters on fruits available for export, 
spoiled consignments and crooked business deals. The main exporters have 
adopted different means of acquiring papaya. The largest exporter, PSL, is also 
Fiji’s largest producer. In addition to its own farm, it sources from satellite farmers. 
One exporting firm has its own farm and also sources from a large number of 
widely disbursed farmers; one uses supply contracts with individual growers.
The staff of exporters collect harvested fruits directly from farmers and are 
responsible for handling and transporting them until they are delivered to 
NWC. Farmers sell fruits not destined for export to traders at the farm-gate 
or directly to consumers either at the roadside or from stalls in local markets. 
Traders sell directly to consumers at the road side or in local markets. They 
also act as middlemen, on-selling to market traders, hotels, restaurants or 
supermarkets. Prices for papaya within the domestic market are usually 
negotiated at the time of sale. Payment is invariably in cash. 
40  FPP Quarterly News Letter, Issue 11, February 19th 2013.
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2.2.4 Quarantine treatment
Until 1990, Fijian papaya was fumigated prior to export at a government-
operated facility, using Ethyl Dibromide (EDB). In 1990, most of Fiji’s export 
markets for papaya and other horticultural commodities were lost as a 
consequence of EDB being banned as a quarantine treatment for fruit-fly 
host products on the grounds that it had been found to be carcinogenic. This 
resulted in a five-year period during which Fiji was unable to export papaya.
With the banning of EDB, Fiji’s fresh fruit export industries were desperate to 
find a quarantine treatment that would be acceptable to Australia and New 
Zealand. With assistance from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Fiji embarked on an ambitious project to acquire High 
Temperature Forced Air (HTFA) quarantine treatment technology. This tech-
nology had been developed by the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) for the treatment of Hawaiian papaya exports to the US mainland. 
USAID’s technical and financial assistance was provided through its 
Commercial Agriculture Development (CAD) Project, and was conditional 
on the quarantine treatment facility being operated by the industry rather 
than by the government. This represented a fundamental departure from 
the tradition in the Pacific islands of government-operated quarantine 
facilities. The condition was met through the creation in 1994 of Nature’s 
Way Cooperative (Fiji) Ltd (NWC) to undertake mandatory quarantine 
treatment on behalf of Fiji’s fruit export industry. NWC began the treatment 
of horticultural produce in October 1996. In addition to papaya, it treats 
eggplant, breadfruit, and mangoes. In 2011, papaya accounted for 
approximately 75 per cent of the export value of these commodities.
For the past 17 years, NWC’s core business has remained the treatment and 
packing of fruit for a fee. It is not involved in exporting, which is undertaken by 
private companies. NWC initially had 65 members comprising exporters and 
farmers and now has over 140 members, including a significant number of 
women.
Since its creation, NWC has received substantial donor assistance, both 
financial and technical. USAID (the plant) and the Fiji Government (the 
building) provided the HTFA facility to NWC as grants in kind. The land on 
which the facility was built was provided by the Government. The New 
Zealand Government provided NWC’s initial working capital and USAID 
covered the cost of employing its general manager for the first year of 
operation. Most recently, the Australian government has helped support 
V A L U E  C H A I N S  I N  T H E  C A R I B B E A N  A N D  T H E  P A C I F I C  I S L A N D S72
expansion of NWC’s HTFA capacity and also agricultural research and value 
chain development through the multi-function Fiji Papaya Project. NWC has 
also received support from British American Tobacco (BAT).
2.2.5 Export markets and marketing
India is the world’s largest papaya producer and consumer. The world’s 
main exporting countries are located in Central and South America, namely 
Mexico, Brazil and Belize. Fiji is the largest exporter in the South Pacific. Its 
nearest significant competitor in the Pacific is the Philippines.
The establishment of the NWC HTFA quarantine treatment facility provided 
potential for Fiji to recommence the export of papaya. In 1996, Fiji negotiated 
a bilateral quarantine agreement (BQA) for market access to New Zealand 
for papaya and three other fruit-fly host crops. This agreement remains in 
effect with only small amendments.41 It took until October 2002 for a BQA to 
be established for Fijian papaya exported to Australia.42 Some 17 years on, 
USDA/APHIS has yet to approve a BQA for import of Fijian papaya into the 
USA, despite the critical role played by USAID in establishing the HTFA facility. 
Currently, four fruit fly host commodities are exported to New Zealand under 
the ‘BQA systems pathway’: papaya, eggplant, mango and breadfruit. The 
BQA covers farm registration, field control measures, exporter and pack house 
registration and operations, quarantine treatment, phyto-sanitary certification 
and regulations and, on arrival in New Zealand, inspection and clearance 
at the port of entry. The systems have a major quality assurance mechanism 
that covers issues such as auditing of the export pathway, compliance and 
monitoring (tracing) and feedback on non-compliance.
2.3. Innovative and interesting features
2.3.1  The use of a service provider as a focal point for efforts to develop 
the value chain
The core business of NWC is as a provider of a service at a single point 
in the papaya value chain. However, it has proved to be a key institution 
41  Bilateral Quarantine Agreement between New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forests and 
Ministry of Agriculture (Fiji) Concerning the Access of Host Material of Fruit Fly Species of Economic 
Significance into New Zealand from Fiji, November 2001.
42  Quarantine Requirements for Import of Fijian Papaya to Australia, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Forestry, October 2002.
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for supporting development along the full length of the chain. This is the 
outcome of a combination of factors.
First, it provides an essential service, without which the export of papaya 
would not be possible, since all papaya (and other fruit fly hosts) must pass 
through its treatment facility prior to export. Second, it is the sole provider 
of this service and has no potential competitors due to the risky nature of 
its business and because HTFA treatment is subject to economies of scale. 
Together, for all participants in the export value chain, these facts mean that 
it is essential that NWC remains functional and that it operates efficiently. 
Third, NWC does not take ownership of the fruits and consequently does 
not have to buy or sell to chain participants, thereby avoiding the possibility 
of commercial conflict with farmers, traders and exporters. This further 
strengthens its position as an entity which receives the support of all value 
chain participants. Fourth, NWC was established as a Cooperative rather than 
a private firm, making it in the eyes of the Fiji Government and donors both 
a legitimate host for donor-funded activities and a legitimate recipient of 
concessional assistance. In addition, NWC’s status as a cooperative that has 
both producing and trading members means that its activities benefit from 
being steered and coordinated by members who have extensive knowledge 
of the value chain but who are not involved in NWC’s day-to-day running.
2.3.2 Mitigating the impact of extreme climatic events
NWC, through the Fiji Papaya Project, has been working on a set of strategies 
to mitigate the impact of high winds, floods and droughts on the livelihoods 
of papaya growers. These include measures, such as the following, which (a) 
limit the damage to papaya trees and (b) assist farmers in the aftermath of 
damage:
• The preparation of farm budgets and gross margin estimates under 
different assumptions relating to adverse climatic events that allow farmers 
to see the risks of papaya growing and the projected impact of adverse 
climatic events on profitability. 
• The design of measures to minimise in advance the impact of extreme 
climatic events on production capacity, such as modifying the size, 
frequency and timing of planting, and installing irrigation and drainage.
• The inclusion of filters in the process of Solo Sunrise varietal selection that 
relate to resilience to adverse climatic events.
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• The design and trialling of response measures to be implemented on 
farm immediately before or after an adverse event to minimise losses. 
For example, (a) the cutting of papaya trunks immediately prior to a 
cyclone to minimise the chance of uprooting thereby preserving the 
trees’ capacity to produce a ratoon crop, and (b) after leaves have 
been stripped by a cyclone, preventing sun damage to exposed fruits by 
covering them with burlap sacks.
These and other measures would be financed by a natural disaster and 
preparedness fund that utilises donor funds and retained earnings of NWC.
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Vanuatu 
The National Vanilla Value Chain3
3.1 The national and international context
3.1.1 Vanuatu
Vanuatu comprises a chain of islands that lie between Fiji to the east and the 
Solomon Islands to the north-west. Its total land area is about two-thirds that 
of Fiji. Its 2014 population was 272,000, compared with 875,000 in Fiji in 2012. 
Its main exports are coconut-based (copra and oil), cocoa, kava and meat 
(beef and veal). Its main agricultural import is rice followed by wheat and 
wheat products. These are the country’s main staple foodstuffs, together with 
locally grown, bananas, taro, breadfruit and cassava. 
3.1.2 World vanilla production, consumption, exports and prices
Natural vanilla comprises only a small proportion of the global vanilla flavour 
market, which is dominated by chemically synthesised vanillin (the flavour 
component in vanilla beans). Natural vanilla sells at up to 100 times the price 
of the synthetic alternative, principally for use in naturally flavoured ice cream 
and as a gourmet cooking ingredient.
World production of natural vanilla is dominated by three countries, 
Indonesia, Madagascar and India, which together account for over 80% of 
global production. In the PICs, in addition to Vanuatu, small amounts of vanilla 
are produced in Papua New Guinea, French Polynesia and Tonga. Export 
supply from the world’s main producing countries tends to vary sharply from 
year-to-year resulting in large changes in global availability.
The world market for natural vanilla is highly concentrated, with the United 
States accounting for over half of all imports and consumption. The EU 
accounts for a further third, with France and Germany being the most 
important markets.
The fact that vanilla normally comprises only a small part of the cost of the 
end product to which it is adding flavour results in demand being price 
inelastic. This, coupled with unstable global export supply, results in highly 
unstable world prices, characterised by short spikes and prolonged troughs. 
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Figure 3: European vanilla prices 1970-2006
3.2 The Vanuatu vanil la value chain
3.2.1 Value chain definition and scale
The chain covers all the approximately 300 farmers who produce vanilla in 
Vanuatu and the single entity which undertakes processing and exporting. 
The chain runs from vanilla farms to the final points of retail sale within 
Vanuatu and to export markets in the region. The value chain is very small, 
with total annual sales amounting to about US$100,000. 
3.2.2 Production 
Vanilla is a climbing orchid, which is normally productive for 12-14 years. Vines 
are usually grown up the trunks of support trees that need to be pruned 
regularly to maintain a suitable amount of shade for the vine. The ground 
around each vine must be heavily mulched. Vines usually produce their first 
flowers in the third year after planting.
Vanilla is an ideal product for small-scale farmers in remote areas in that it 
has a very high value-to-weight ratio and does not perish rapidly. However, 
cultivation is knowledge and management intensive. Farmers diversifying into 
vanilla production require considerable training and extension support. Both 
vanilla growing and on-farm post-harvest activities are labour intensive. Each 
flower must be hand pollinated within 12 hours of opening. This is an arduous 
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task since the flowering season spreads over two months but individual 
flowers on each cluster open one-by-one and last for only one day. 
The commercial growing of vanilla in Vanuatu was initiated by Piero 
Bianchessi, who set up a family-owned Vanuatu-registered company for this 
purpose in 1987: Venui Vanilla (VV). It soon became evident that the site of 
VV’s plantation in the south of the island of Espirito Santo was climatically 
unsuitable for efficient vanilla production. Thus, VV decided to extend 
production to small-scale growers located in other areas of Espirito Santo and 
on other islands in partnership with the Farmers Support Association (FSA) and 
the Association’s Spices Network. The latter was formed in 2005, with funding 
from Oxfam (NZ). 
Vanilla is currently produced on seven of Vanuatu’s islands, with the annual 
production of individual islands in 2011 ranging from 88 kg to 449 kg. A 
typical farm plot has 100-200 vanilla and/or peppercorn plants covering 
approximately 0.25 ha. Annual national production from 2006 to 2011 is shown 
in Figure 4. It will be seen that national production varies substantially from 
year-to-year. This is due principally to changes in weather conditions. The 
production of individual islands varies more markedly. 
Source: Venui Vanilla
The FSA was established in 1983 as a not-for-profit, farmer-based NGO to assist 
farmers with the operation of estates which they acquired abruptly at Inde-
pendence.43 In 2010 FSA had over 200 small-scale farmer members but only 
two permanent field officers (plus secretarial support staff at offices in Port 
43  FAO, Farm Support Association (FSA) Farmer Market Linkage Activity for the Vanuatu Vegetable 
Sector, June 2010.
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Vila and Luganville.) The productive partnership between VV and FSA, which 
has now lasted for over 20 years, has been based on a division of functions 
under which VV provides the market outlet for farmers and FSA provides the 
extension outreach to remote locations. Beside the internal control system for 
organic certification, FSA supplies its members with up-to-date technical in-
formation and training material, and provides field coaching, plus theoretical 
and practical training through the use of pilot plots and the active participa-
tion of selected lead farmers. The outcome of the partnership is that VV has 
access to quality supply from remote locations and FSA members, despite 
their remote location, have the opportunity to generate cash income. Much 
of FSA’s work has been in partnership with donors, including FAO, SPC, AusAID, 
NZAID, and the US Peace Corps.44 FSA also receives a levy on vanilla sales and 
fees for activities it carries out on behalf of VV.
All vanilla production in Vanuatu is organic, although not all is certified as 
such. Venui Vanilla together with 60 farmers from Santo, Malo and Ambae 
were first certified in 1996 by the New Zealand certifying agency BioGro. This 
was subsequently replaced by the EU’s Ecocert and AsureQuality NZ. As-
ureQuality, which is IFOAM accredited, is VV’s current certifier. The choice of 
certifiers has been based on cost, the aid support available at the time, and 
whether the certifying body is accredited to IFOAM, the international organic 
umbrella organization. From the outset the internal control for the certification 
process has been provided by the FSA as a service covered by a fee paid by 
VV. Over the years, the FSA has also received donor assistance to support its 
Spices Network. Most certification is done on the basis of farmer groups, using 
an internal control system operated by the FSA under which details of each 
farmer’s production are collected and recorded. The organic certification 
agency checks a sample of this data as the basis of its annual assessment. In 
addition to paying FSA for providing the internal control service, VV also cov-
ers the costs of the certifying agency.
The cost of organic certification is high relative to the value of the vanilla 
certified. Consequently, in recent years VV has confined the coverage of 
certification to growers in less remote locations. Roughly 30% of farmers are 
currently covered by a certification scheme. There has been a progressive 
raising of standards as growers have become familiar with requirements. This 
has led to some farmers losing their certification for not meeting standards. It 
44  FSA has been heavily reliant on providing extension services to farmers largely financed by donors. 
A May 2010 report prepared for the New Zealand Government by Kinsa Associates and released 
under the NZ Freedom of Information Act (http://www.aid.govt.nz/webfmsend/29) is critical of 
FSA’s informal set up and organisation but acknowledges that it has successfully established an 
effective, if casual, mode of extension.
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is possible that in the present (2013) annual inspection, more may do so. The 
target is to expand certification to 60% of farmers over a two-year period. This 
would not only allow spice growers in isolated locations to obtain organic 
certification but would also enable them to take advantage of the extension 
services offered by the Spices Network.
VV has considered the possibility of obtaining Fairtrade certification, but has 
concluded that this is not feasible for a set of reasons. First, it would be com-
plicated to organise due to the scattered nature of production, the remote 
locations of many farms and the lack of cooperatives. Second, there is limited 
consumer interest within the region in fairtrade products, resulting at best in 
their attracting only a small retail price premium. Third, the Fair trade organi-
sation (FTO) would require VV to pay a ‘fair’ purchase price. This, together with 
the administrative costs of certification, would raise the total cost to VV asso-
ciated with certification to a level at which it would require continuous subsi-
disation. VV’s losses would be increased further by the FTO’s requirement that 
its mandatory price be paid for all vanilla regardless of quality. 
3.2.3 Processing and marketing
Vanilla beans are graded based on their length, appearance (colour, sheen, 
presence of any splits, presence of blemishes), and the moisture content 
of the fruit.  The most highly graded beans are whole, dark, plump and oily, 
visually attractive with no blemishes, and must not have been over-dried.
The harvested vanilla pods go through a lengthy on-farm process of water 
killing (to stop further growth), sun drying, sun sweating, in-box sweating, in-
shed curing, bundling and in-box conditioning. The total time from harvest to 
the finished product is 110-140 days. The equipment required is simple and 
robust, consisting of items such as saucepans, blankets, boxes and plastic 
sheets and bottles. Most of the necessary equipment was provided to farmers 
by VV.  It is essential that each phase of processing is carried out correctly, 
since each is a critical determinant of the final quality and value of the 
bean. All processing is done on the farms due to their remote locations, other 
than for conditioning, a substantial amount of which is done after delivery 
to Venui Vanilla. Given the specialised skills needed, farmers are advised to 
consider investing in a cooperative curing centre operated by a trusted and 
experienced curer.
Growers’ cured beans are graded by VV or FSA at the point of purchase. 
VV pays prices which it sets for each season based on market conditions. 
Disputes regarding grade or buying price are rare. Growers have confidence 
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in VV because of the company’s long-term involvement in the sector, where 
the agreed price has always been paid for each clearly defined quality 
standard. VV’s credibility with growers has been further strengthened by its 
long-term association with FSA, which is also well respected by farmers.45
The prices paid to growers exhibit a certain amount of instability, but the 
extent of this is moderated by the fact that export prices for the premium 
quality niche market and value-added products that VV sells are more stable 
than those for bulk vanilla.
The fact that vanilla is non-perishable and has a high value-to-weight ratio 
means that farmers market just a few kilos at a time and that there is no need 
for physical assembly points. Cured pods are usually collected by FSA staff 
on field trips, dropped off during visits to the VV facility or its offices at Vila or 
Santo, or otherwise delivered informally to VV.
Since VV’s initial plantation commenced yielding, in most years the company 
has processed and marketed all of the vanilla produced in Vanuatu.46 VV’s 
processing facilities on Espritu Santo, which are world class, were financed by 
VV without donor support. However, it has at various times received support 
for its marketing and other activities from a number of external organisations, 
including Projet d’Organisation des Producteurs pour la Commercialisation 
Associative (POPACA) and the Brussels-based Centre for the Development of 
Enterprise (CDE) for the initial cost of the external organic certifier.47 
From the outset, VV established a facility for the processing of small and 
split beans into vanilla essence and vanilla paste. All vanilla production was 
initially marketed within Vanuatu. In the mid-1990s, as production began to 
rise above local demand, VV participated for three consecutive years in the 
Melbourne and Sydney Fine Food Fairs, invited and financed by the South 
Pacific Trade Commission (today PITIC). A first contract for the export of first-
grade between VV and one buyer/distributor in the Melbourne area was 
concluded in 1997 and was still continuing in 2013.
45  Piero Bianchessi plans to train two ni-Vanuatu, one from Ambae island and one from Tanna island 
in the south, to be buying agents who will later become independent operators, buying and 
marketing in their own right. Their training would include not only a thorough grounding in quality 
standards and packaging and marketing operations but also accompanying Mr Bianchessi to food 
fairs so as to become familiar with the nature of the market and make industry contacts. This train-
ing will require donor funding because of the high costs involved.
46  During the vanilla boom in 2002, a number of novice traders entered the market and purchased 
and on-sold vanilla with little regard for quality, negatively impacting the market. Source: Vanuatu 
Economic Opportunities Fact-Finding Mission, Peter Bazeley and Ben Mullen, AusAID and NZAID, 
July 2006.
47  John McKinnon, Kinsa Associates, Review of the Vanuatu Farm Support Association (FSA), P 11.
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In 2011, beans accounted for roughly half of the total value of VV’s vanilla 
sales, vanilla extract for 45% and vanilla paste for 6%. VV’s main export market 
in terms of value comprises three New Zealand ice cream companies. In 2011 
these accounted for 43% of the total value of VV’s vanilla exports. In 2011, 
all sales to these companies were in the form of extract and paste. In the 
same year, exports of beans to Japan comprised VV’s second largest export 
market (29%). Australia ranked third (21%), taking a combination of beans, 
extract and paste. The export of these products to the nearby French territory 
of New Caledonia accounted for the remaining 7% of export value. Vanilla 
produced in Vanuatu cannot compete in the larger European and North 
American markets due to the high cost of transportation. In 2011, sales to the 
domestic market accounted for just under one fifth of the value of all sales. 
Beans account for more than half the value of domestic sales, followed by 
extract and paste, for which there is an excellent domestic tourist market for 
packaged products. The total value of all VV exports in 2011 was some Vatu 
7.7 million, around US$85,000 
3.3. Innovative and interesting features
3.3.1 ‘Pulling’ products through the value chain
The VV value chain demonstrates that a company that processes and 
exports an agricultural commodity is potentially well placed to develop the 
entire supply chain for its raw material. Such a company is better placed than 
an external body, such as a donor agency, or farmers or other domestic value 
chain participants to assess the quality needs of foreign buyers and the value 
which they place on organic and other certification.
To obtain the necessary supplies in the circumstances prevailing in the Pacific 
islands, the exporting company invariably needs to be proactively involved 
in the development of the sector, including making significant long-term 
investment and having a long-term presence. VV has demonstrated that 
a company prepared to do this can effectively ‘pull’ products through the 
value chain in circumstances where there is little or no prospect of scattered 
producers in isolated rural areas initiating production and successfully 
‘pushing’ it into an export market.
In the case of vanilla in Vanuatu, it was also essential that VV ensure that 
the incentive to grow vanilla was maximised by making certain that growers 
had a remunerative market for their entire vanilla output, not only for export 
quality beans. VV achieved this by establishing a capacity to process lower 
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quality beans into vanilla extract and paste. A combination of efficient, high-
quality processing and adroit labelling has resulted in the total value of these 
processed products exceeding the value of VV’s sale of high-quality beans.
3.3.2 The role of organic certification
The high cost of organic certification and the fact that organic products at 
best fetch only small premiums in regional retail markets, makes the net direct 
benefits of certification questionable. However, to obtain organic certification, 
the selling company must demonstrate traceability of all the components of 
its product, an acceptable level of cleanliness in storage, handling, transport 
and manufacture, and that its labelling is accurate. Thus, even if a purchasing 
company in Australia, New Zealand or Japan is not interested in the organic 
nature of a product, the fact that an exporter has the capacity to supply 
organic products will strengthen the company’s expectation that it will make 
a sound trading partner. This is particularly important for a small exporter, such 
as VV, based on a distant island. Thus, organic certification has served as a 
marketing tool for VV rather than enabling it to export at prices which reflect 
price premiums for organics in destination retail markets.
 While organic certification has served this role, Hazard Analysis Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) food safety certification is increasingly being 
adopted as the main instrument of quality assurance. HACCP certification 
is likely to become obligatory in the near future for enterprises which export 
processed products for human consumption. Given the high cost of obtaining 
certification, a subsector such as that for vanilla in Vanuatu cannot afford 
more than one type. Thus, it is likely to be necessary for VV to switch from 
organic to HACCP certification in the near future.
Since it is relatively simple to insert organic control points into a HACCP 
certification system, it would be reasonably easy for international certifying 
agencies to move to one-step combined HACCP food safety/organic 
verification systems under which both the food safety and organic 
characteristics of a product are certified in one exercise. This would benefit 
all enterprises involved in producing and exporting foodstuff but particularly 
those with small throughputs, such as VV. 




The Honiara Floriculture Value Chain4
4.1 National context
The nation of the Solomon Islands (see map at the beginning of Section B) 
comprises six main islands of roughly similar size plus some 900 smaller islands. 
These are located to the east of Papua New Guinea and to the north west 
of Vanuatu, in a chain which covers a total distance of about 1,000km from 
the island of Choiseul in the north west to San Cristobal in the south east. The 
population of the Solomon Islands is approximately 550,000. Honiara, the na-
tional capital, located on Guadalcanal Island in the south west of the chain, 
has a population of about 70,000. The islands’ oceanic-equatorial climate is 
extremely humid throughout the year, with a mean temperature of 26.5°C. 
In 2003, a Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
was dispatched to Guadalcanal to quell unrest. RAMSI remains, having 
developed into a partnership between the people and Government of the 
Solomon Islands and 15 Pacific countries. Its main purpose is to assist national 
recovery and development.
4.2 The Solomon Islands f lor iculture value chain
4.2.1 Value chain definition and scale
The case study refers to a short and small value chain in and around Honiara. 
It involves some 500 producers who grow flowers in their backyards which are 
arranged by florists and retailed.
4.2.2 Production
Until 2003, there was virtually no growing of flowers for sale in the Solomon 
Islands. The practice began after the emergence of a demand for cut-
flowers following the influx of RAMSI personnel. It was further encouraged by 
a widening of demand stimulated by local economic growth stemming from 
the presence and activities of RAMSI. Since the growing of sufficient flowers 
to produce a small supplementary income for households requires little land, 
the demand for cut flowers has been met through households in and around 
Honiara growing blooms in their back yards.
4.2.3 Value adding
Since flower arrangements sell at a higher price than unarranged cut flowers, 
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those with skills in arrangement (referred to locally as ‘florists’) took the 
initiative to arrange flowers which they had grown or purchased. This was and 
continues to be done at the home of the florist, normally on a part-time basis. 
4.2.4 Marketing
Flower growers who are not also florists sell their output directly to florists or at 
an area dedicated to flowers at Honiara Central Market. About 40 growers 
currently sell at the market. Florists buy from an informal network of producers 
and from the Central Market.
In recent years, demand has gradually increased beyond the expatriate 
community to include businesses, churches, government departments and 
the general public, who buy flowers for special occasions. There is no ‘flower 
shop’ in Honiara. Florists sell their arrangements directly from their homes and 
at the Central Market.
All flowers are sold locally within the island of Guadalcanal. There is no 
exportation.
4.3 Innovative and interesting features
4.3.1  An appropriate free-market response to meet demand for a new 
product
The floriculture value chain developed initially without any government or 
external support. The part-time growing of flowers on a very small-scale by 
a relatively large number of households reflects the fact that there are no 
significant barriers to entry into the activity. Households’ backyards contain 
enough land and the only other significant input is household labour, which 
is in abundance in many households.48 Flower arranging is similarly labour-
intensive with virtually no start-up costs. The activities in the chain provide 
small amounts of additional income to the households concerned.
A larger-scale response to the emergence of demand would have meant 
considerable investment in expensive peri-urban land for the establishment 
of a flower farm or incurring expensive transport costs to bring flowers into 
Honiara from a more distant farm. It would also have been less desirable in 
terms of income distribution, since it would have resulted in a few full-time 
48  United Nations Human Settlement Programme, Solomon Islands: Honiara Urban Profile, 2012.
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jobs rather than the opportunity for many households to generate a little 
additional income. 
Although small in terms of the total product value, floriculture on 
Gaudalcanal is good example of how a well-functioning, appropriate chain 
can develop naturally to meet emerging demand.
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Features of value chain 
development  
in the Caribbean  
and Pacific
IIII
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1. Character istics of Small Island Value Chains
1.1 Remote locations
All but one of the case studies refers to a commodity produced within an 
island nation. The exception is Belize. Grenada, Jamaica, Haiti and the three 
PICs are all a long distance from the closest developed country markets. 
Belize is also distant from the main markets for its citrus, the USA and the 
EU. Remoteness from markets is a particular problem for the three rapidly 
perishable export crops included in the case studies, mangoes, taro and 
papaya.49 
1.2 Vulnerability to disruptive weather events
All of the case study countries are located in regions characterised by 
extreme weather events capable of devastating crop production capacity. 
The small size of the countries means that hurricanes and typhoons can 
damage capacity across an entire country.50
1.3 The small scale of the value chains
The small size of most of the Caribbean and Pacific ACP nations in terms of 
both land area and population means that value chains necessarily involve 
relatively few farmers and small amounts of output. The numbers of farms in 
the case-study chains range from 13 for organic cocoa in Grenada to 3,700 
for taro grown on the Fijian island of Taveuni. In some instances, such as in 
Grenada, all activities within the domestic value chain to the port of export 
are located in their entirety within an area of a few square kilometres. In the 
Solomon Islands, floriculture and the market for cut flowers are concentrated 
in and around Honiara. However, in two of the PIC value chains included 
in the study, despite the involvement of only small numbers of farmers, 
production is either scattered over a set of islands (vanilla in Vanuatu) or most 
production is on a single island but, prior to export, must be transported by 
sea to the island on which the country’s international airport or main sea port 
is located (taro in Fiji).
49  Note that other developing countries with successful horticultural export industries, such as Kenya, 
are even further from their main developed country markets. However, they tend to have a greater 
frequency of scheduled flights to cities in these markets.
50  This is marginally less of a problem in nations, such as Vanuatu, which comprise chains of islands 
extending over 1,000km or more.
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The small quantity of output passing down some of the value chains means 
that there is little scope for exploiting economies of scale. Consequently, a 
chain is only viable if the economies of scale in all the activities within the 
chain are small or if the final product(s) can be sold at exceptionally high 
prices.
1.4 Tourism
The majority of the case-study countries have large tourist sectors, some 
of which contribute more to GDP than agriculture. Tourism increases the 
demand for domestically grown food crops due to their use in hotels and 
restaurants and their sale in processed form as souvenirs. The growth of agro-
tourism provides not only additional demand for farm products but also the 
potential to earn further income in the form of accommodation on estates 
and entrance fees to observe working farms and processing facilities. 
1.5 Disproportionately large donor assistance 
In all the case studies, other than for that relating to the Solomon Islands, 
aid has played an important role in establishing the chain and/or in its 
development. This reflects the generally very high levels of aid per capita 
received by the case study countries. Other than for Haiti, this, in turn, reflects 
the fact that, worldwide, countries with small populations tend to receive 
disproportionately large amounts of aid per capita.51 In Haiti, aid levels per 
capita are also high reflecting the fact that it is one of the world’s least 
developed countries and has recently received additional aid following the 
devastating January 2010 earthquake. However, Haiti receives far less aid on 
a per capita basis than the much richer small islands of the Caribbean and 
Pacific.52 The PICs, in particular, receive exceptionally high levels of aid.53 This 
is principally due to their small populations but also because they neighbour 
two high income countries, Australia and New Zealand, which focus much 
of their aid on Pacific countries. The small PICs receive over half of all New 
51  See: UNDP, Towards Sustaining MDG Progress, 5: Official Development Assistance: Towards Human 
Resilience: Sustaining MDG Progress in an Age of Economic Uncertainty, especially Chart 5.9. Note 
that farmers in the EU, Japan and other developed countries are in effect also aided, through 
policy measures aimed at supporting domestic agriculture that lead to transfers from consumers to 
producers.
52  In 2005-06, prior to the earthquake, amongst the world’s poorest countries, Haiti ranked only 21st as 
a recipient of aid on a per capita basis. See: Robert Utz, Will Countries with Insufficient Aid Pleas-
Stand Up? CFP Working Paper Series No. 7, September, 2010. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
CFPEXT/Resources/CFP_Working_Paper_07.pdf
53  Even Fiji, which is ranked by the OECD as a lower middle income country, receives substantially 
more aid per capita then the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Malawi and Ethiopia. 
See: World Bank, Net ODA received per capita. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.
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Zealand’s overseas development assistance54 and 35% of Australia’s annual 
bilateral and regional aid budget of over US$3 billion.55 Amongst the case-
study countries, in 2011-12 Australia’s aid to the Solomon Islands and to 
Vanuatu amounted to, respectively, US$ 467 and US$265 per capita.56
2. Chain Init iation and Development
Only one of the case studies, vanilla in Vanuatu, refers to the development 
of a completely new crop sub-sector. The value chains for taro in Fiji and 
flowers in the Solomon Islands developed to accommodate a change in the 
order of magnitude of production which stemmed from a sudden increase 
in demand. All the Caribbean case studies and that for papaya in Fiji refer 
to value chains that have been in existence for many years and have been 
progressively modified in response to external events and through the efforts 
of individuals and enterprises to expand their throughput and otherwise 
develop their business.
2.1 Individual initiative
Two of the value chains, vanilla/Vanuatu and cocoa/Grenada were 
established by individuals, both foreign nationals. Both took an explicit 
decision to create a new activity, motivated by a combination of altruism 
and their fascination with technical aspects of the value chain. There would 
appear to have been no specific event relating to any aspect of the crops 
or to the products derived from them which triggered these two initiatives. 
It was simply a case of individuals identifying and exploiting already existing 
opportunities. A key to the success of the chains was that both individuals, 
although scientists and engineers by profession, were able to foresee the 
potential of the then nascent markets for organic and gourmet products.
2.2 External triggers
Specific external events played a key role in initiating two of the value chains:
• The most clear cut example is for taro exported from the Fijian island of 
Taveuni, which was triggered by an outbreak of taro leaf blight on Samoa.
54  Show Me the Money: New Zealand Government Aid in Numbers, By Joanna Spratt and Terence 
Wood, P.4. http://nzadds.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/summary-show-me-the-money-v3.pdf 
55  AusAid, Annual Report 2011-12, pp339/40. http://www.ausaid.gov.au/AnnualReports/Pages/rep-
12default.aspx
56  For the Solomon Islands, this figure includes Australia’s contribution to RAMSI (see section B 4.1, 
above).
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• In the case of papaya exports from Fiji, the establishment of the present 
value chain was triggered by the banning in 1990 of the existing means 
of treating fruit fly host products prior to export and the subsequent 
conditions imposed by USAID for supporting the establishment of an 
acceptable replacement means of treatment.
2.3 Domestic triggers
• Floriculture in the Solomon Islands was triggered by internal unrest which 
resulted in the arrival of RAMSI personnel, which, in turn, created a demand 
for cut flowers.
• The Jamaica Egg Farmers Association decision to move into egg packing 
and processing was in effect triggered by a non-event, namely the 
stagnation of the domestic market for eggs. 
2.4 Gradual progression
• The Agro Grace value chain for hot pepper has principally been the result 
of commercial decisions taken over a 90-year period. There is no single 
clear cut internal or external event that initiated the present form of the 
chain.
• In the case of the Citrus Company of Belize, the large-scale processing of 
citrus began over 70 years ago. The present value chain is the result of a 
succession of steps aimed at unifying and increasing the efficiency of the 
country’s citrus sub-sector, the most important of which were the donor-
supported vertical and horizontal integration in 2001-02 and the recent 
partial split of a set of large farmers from the citrus growers association 
which, prior to this split, embraced all commercial growers.
• In the case of mangoes exported from Haiti by JMB SA, the value chain 
has evolved since the creation of JMB in 1983. No external events can 
be said to have triggered development of the JMB value chain, but two 
events influenced the present structure of the chain. First, the development 
some 30 years ago of hot water treatment of mangoes with the assistance 
of USDA. Second, the 2007 banning of Haitian mango exports to the USA, 
which required the introduction of domestic measures to detect and 
control fruit fly infestation.
It will be seen that, where there was an obvious trigger for the establishment 
of a value chain, this trigger related to demand. None of the triggers was an 
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independent change in the quantity or nature of domestic production. This 
reflects the fact that all of these chains were established principally at the 
initiative of the private sector, albeit often with donor support, rather than at 
the behest of donors.
3. Relationships within Value Chains
3.1 Vertical relationships
It is evident from the case studies that it is productive for firms and individuals 
operating at one stage of a value chain to interact with other stages in ways 
that go beyond those of open-market selling and buying at spot prices. This 
can be achieved in two conceptually distinct ways, through (a) contracting 
or otherwise interacting with upstream or downstream enterprises and (b) 
vertical integration, i.e. extending ownership into different stages of the chain 
through either taking over or establishing new capacity. All nine of the value 
chains studied are characterised by the vertical integration of stages or by 
contractual arrangements between entities at different stages. In Jamaica, 
GK has used a combination of these. It recently established its own pepper 
mash processing facility upstream of the manufacture of its hot pepper 
products and, further upstream, contracted growers for the supply of fresh 
peppers to the facility. Meanwhile, downstream it has acquired ownership of 
firms that undertake the processing and marketing of pepper products. In line 
with GK’s world-wide business model, it still contracts out the manufacture 
of its sauces in Jamaica, despite the fact that this is the stage at which its 
products are given their unique identity.
Vertical linking within a chain has also been achieved through the creation 
of associations and cooperatives of participants at one level of value chains 
which partly or fully own enterprises operating at other levels. Among the 
case studies, the most straightforward example of this is the Belize Citrus 
Growers Association, which is the majority owner of CPBL, the downstream 
processor of its members’ output.
An unusual example of a cooperative that has links to other stages of 
the value chain is Nature’s Way Cooperative in Fiji. Rather than being a 
cooperative that owns other stages of the value chain, NWC operates at a 
single stage and is owned by members which operate at other stages. NWC 
owns Fiji’s sole facility for the pre-export HTFA quarantine treatment of fruits. 
This treatment is an essential stage in the value chain for papaya exported 
from Fiji. NWC’s members comprise both growers and exporters, i.e. individuals 
V A L U E  C H A I N S  I N  T H E  C A R I B B E A N  A N D  T H E  P A C I F I C  I S L A N D S96
and enterprises which participate in upstream and downstream stages of 
the value chain. Although they have contributed little to NWC in terms of 
equity, they are notionally its owners and are occasionally paid dividends. 
NWC does not take ownership of fruits, which belong to exporters during the 
period that they are undergoing quarantine treatment and being packed. 
This arrangement has a set of advantages which have made NWC the main 
driver of the chain (see section B 2.3.1).
The case studies highlight a number of different reasons for enterprises to 
establish upstream and downstream relationships:
• A processor or exporter which wants to increase the scale of its activities 
or operate its processing facilities at full capacity may see it as worthwhile 
to assist growers to increase their output. This is particularly likely to be the 
case where growers must deliver their output to a single enterprise. Good 
examples of this are Venui Vanilla in Vanuatu and the CPBL in Belize both of 
which are monopsonists. In the case of CPBL the industry was deliberately 
consolidated through both vertical and horizontal integration with the aim 
of increasing operational efficiency. Processing and exporting enterprises 
that need an assured supply from growers but which face competition 
from other buyers may be able to support growers as part of a contract 
farming arrangement. However, this can lead to the incurring of losses if 
there are ready opportunities for side selling, as has been the case for taro 
exporters in Fiji.
• For perishable commodities, processors may seek to schedule the supply 
of their raw material from growers. GADP does this in Jamaica through 
contracts with growers which specify delivery schedules.
• It may be necessary for a commodity and products derived from it to be 
traceable through the full length of the value chain to allow one or more 
of the products to be certified as having particular qualities. 
• Processors may wish to have control over on-farm practices to ensure 
that their main raw material has characteristics which minimise their 
processing costs and/or maximise the value of their sales. There are two 
good examples of this in the case studies. In Haiti, JMB seeks to minimise 
the need to reject low-quality mangoes at its pre-export quarantine and 
packing facility through an arrangement with a farmers’ association 
(ASPVEFS) which harvests fruits selectively and undertakes all post-harvest 
operations. Belize Citrus Products sells its juices at a premium in export 
markets due to their high brix/acidity. It assures that deliveries have this 
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quality through prior maturity testing of farmers’ fruits at its laboratory 
combined with a system under which harvesting and processing are 
coordinated at short notice.
• Finally an enterprise may integrate vertically simply to raise the scale of its 
involvement and its profits.
3.2 Horizontal integration and co-operation
In the Caribbean, there is a significant amount of horizontal cooperation at 
the farmer level in the shape of cooperatives or associations. Citrus growers 
in Belize and subsets of mango farmers in Haiti are particularly well organised 
into associations that play important functional roles within their value chains. 
Large-scale egg producers in Jamaica have cooperated to initiate and 
operate domestic egg processing facilities. Cocoa growers in Grenada and 
hot pepper farmers in Jamaica are also organised into cooperatives and 
associations.
Within the Pacific Islands there is no strong cooperative tradition. Farmers tend 
to sell individually to processors, traders or consumers. Support for farmers is 
provided principally by the government, donors and NGOs through institutions 
which they have either taken the lead in creating or which they are supporting 
financially and/or with technical assistance. Processing, and especially domes-
tic trading and exporting, tend to be characterised by intense competition 
rather than cooperation. The exception is the quarantine treatment of papaya 
in Fiji, for which there are substantial economies of scale which necessitate all 
exports passing through a single facility (see section 3.3, below)
3.3 Public-private partnerships
Partnerships between enterprises and donors/NGOs are particularly 
important for agricultural commodity export value chains in the very small 
countries of the Pacific and Caribbean regions. In the area of marketing, 
sponsored visits by Venui Vanilla to three consecutive Australian Fine Food 
Fairs proved invaluable for making contacts that have led to an enduring 
market outlet in New Zealand.
VV has also depended on a long-lasting partnership with the Farmers Support 
Association to provide technical assistance to remotely located farmers and 
logistical support for organic certification.
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The volume and value of the flow of commodities through small-island 
agricultural commodity chains are necessarily small, yet, for some, there are 
substantial economies of scale in processing and quarantine treatment for 
export. For papaya in Fiji, the quarantine treatment facility operated by NWC 
could not have been established without grants in kind from the national 
government and USAID, since exporters were neither willing nor able to 
provide finance and neither the commercial banks nor the Fiji Development 
Bank were prepared to do so.
In Grenada, the founder of the Grenada Chocolate Company developed 
productive partnerships with cocoa growers, with an established processor, a 
foreign customer and a zero-carbon shipper. 
4.  The Role of Technology in Providing Market 
Access and Improving Eff iciency
The adoption of technologies and processes that were new to the country 
has been fundamental for the development of seven of the nine value chains 
covered by the case studies. Such adoption has had three distinct purposes: 
the treatment of fresh fruits to meet the requirements of importing countries, 
the introduction of additional processing to create new products, and the 
introduction of new processing and technologies to increase efficiency.
4.1 Quarantine treatment
New means of treatment had to be adopted to eliminate fruit-fly infestation 
of mangoes exported from Haiti and papaya exported from Fiji. Both were a 
necessary condition for resuscitation of export value chains after imports into 
the main foreign market had been banned. In the case of Haiti, the exporter, 
JMB, invested in the necessary IQF facility. The HTFA facility in Fiji was provided 
by donors and supported by donor-financed technical assistance. 
4.2 New processing technology and products 
The introduction of new processing technology into the two very small-scale 
value chains for vanilla in Vanuatu and cocoa in Grenada was also an 
essential component of their success. In both cases, use of the technology 
has raised the income of farmers over and above that which they would 
have obtained from export of the basic commodity. The processing by 
Venui Vanilla has meant that a greater proportion of farmers’ total output 
is exportable, thereby raising the income of farmers sufficiently for them to 
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maintain an interest in growing vanilla. The manufacture of organically grown 
cocoa by the Grenada Chocolate Company into high value products has 
generated sufficient additional value added within the chain for farmers to 
be paid a higher price than they would receive from sales to the Grenada 
Cocoa Board, assuring that farmers remain committed to selling to GCC. Both 
these initiatives were financed as commercial investments.
In Jamaica, the value chain for eggs supplied to the domestic market has 
been extended through a joint venture by egg producers and a local chilled 
food distributor to invest in technology to produce a set of liquefied egg 
products. This was undertaken as a commercial venture by the companies 
involved.
4.3 Efficiency increase
In Belize, CPBL has established a capacity to process waste products from its 
citrus juice concentrate plants into valuable goods, thereby raising the overall 
value of its products and reducing its processing costs while simultaneously 
minimising the adverse impact of its activities on the environment. These 
investments have been undertaken as commercial ventures aimed both at 
raising the profitability of CPBL directly and increasing the support which it 
receives from the local community.
In Fiji, the adoption of plastic crates for the collection and domestic 
transportation of papaya has reduced post-harvest losses significantly. The 
adoption of this simple technology would benefit virtually all fresh produce 
industries throughout the region.
4.4 Exceptions
Of all the case-study value chains, the only crops which have not been 
subjected to new or enhanced treatment and/or processing are taro grown 
on Fiji and cut flowers produced in and around the capital of the Solomon 
Islands, Honiara. In the case of taro, the main need has been to introduce 
technological change at the production level of the chain to reverse 
the adverse impact which greatly expanded production has had upon 
the natural vegetation and soils of Taveuni. In the case of cut flowers, the 
development of the value chain was founded on the fact that an opportunity 
developed for an economic activity for which there was no need for any 
investment in treatment and processing. 
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5. Small Island Economies and Niche Markets
All of the case studies refer to crop value chains that have been developed 
to supply niche markets. Since the number of case studies is small and the 
studies were not selected randomly, they probably give a false impression 
of the importance of niche markets for agricultural commodities for the two 
regions as a whole. Notwithstanding this, one would expect niche markets 
to be particularly important for small isolated countries, where, amongst 
export commodities, high value-to-weight commodities have a comparative 
advantage due to the inordinately high cost of transport. The niche export 
markets which have been exploited are of three types. The first comprise 
principally the country’s diaspora in developed countries. The second are 
for products which have unique characteristics associated with their origin. 
The third is where export markets can be supplied during periods of seasonal 
retail price peaks. These three types of niche market cover seven of the case 
study value chains. The remaining two chains refer to domestic niche markets. 
5.1 Products marketed to diaspora 
Small island nations in the Caribbean and Pacific have tended to experience 
high levels of emigration over the past 50-60 years. Some of these diasporas 
are relatively large and comprise important markets for traditional foodstuffs 
from their country of origin. The case studies include three examples of 
exports that are targeted principally at diasporas. The exports are of two 
types: (a) bulky and perishable fresh foodstuffs to countries where the 
mainstream staples are grains and (b) high-value processed foodstuffs such 
as spices. The diasporas of the Pacific islands are located principally in New 
Zealand and the main areas of heavy population in south-eastern Australia, 
where climatic conditions are unsuited to the growing of the root crops, 
which are the traditional staples of islanders.57 Both taro and breadfruit are 
now important export earners for Fiji. However, over the long term the market 
is likely to be eroded as the PIC diasporas become progressively more 
assimilated culturally and switch to the consumption of lower-priced grains.
The case study of hot pepper products originating in Jamaica relates to an 
important high-value component of the Caribbean diet, namely sauces and 
other items derived from hot pepper mash. Such products differ from fresh 
staples in that there is potential for sales to extend progressively beyond the 
57  Note that mported wheat and rice are rapidly becoming of equal or greater importance in the 
PICs.
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diaspora into mainstream markets. This is unlikely to happen for perishable 
fresh staples, which have a low value-to-weight ratio that makes them 
uncompetitive with grains as sources of calories. 
5.2 Products with unique characteristics
The locations of the Caribbean and Pacific islands and the fact that some 
are of volcanic origin means that they have unique growing conditions that 
endow crops with distinctive tastes, textures and appearances. Within the 
value chains studied, the physical characteristics of Grenadian cocoa and 
Vanuatu vanilla have been maintained and accentuated skilfully through 
meticulous labour-intensive processing. The value of the products has been 
enhanced further through packaging and marketing that exploits their exotic 
origins. This has allowed sale to tourists and in export markets at sufficiently 
high prices to cover the high costs of domestic small-scale processing.
In Belize, to meet the diverse requirements of a wide range of clients, CPBL 
has established its own capacity to extract essential oils, which it uses to fine 
tune the composition of its juices.
In Haiti and Fiji, conditions are suited to the growing of, respectively, the 
Madame Francique variety of mango and the red-fleshed Solo Sunrise 
variety of papaya, both of which sell at premium prices in developed country 
markets. Haiti’s JMB has increased the size of the premium it obtains on its 
export sales of mango by working in the USA with the up-market Whole Foods 
retail chain to carve out a market niche by positioning its brands around 
natural production, organic and fairtrade themes.
Product branding has played an important role in establishing a market and 
sustaining demand in all the export value chains covered in the studies other 
than that for fresh taro. For products exported from small developing countries, 
branding is particularly necessary due to the need to establish and maintain 
the credibility of a product whose source is not well known and which potential 
consumers may initially regard with suspicion. For such countries, it is important 
that the brand includes a positive association with the origin of the product. 
Both Venui Vanilla and the Grenada Cocoa Company pack their products 
ready for retailing in branded packaging that shows the commodity prior to 
harvest set against a background which emphasises its tropical origins. Solo 
Sunrise papaya are exported from Fiji as ‘Fiji Red’, the ‘Fiji Red’ brand has a 
unique logo however it is currently underutilised by exporters. Through Nature’s 
Way Cooperative, the ‘Fiji Red’ brand will be patented and exporters will be 
encouraged to use it on boxes and fruit stickers.   The long-established Grace 
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Kennedy Group places the group’s predominantly black and white ‘Grace’ 
logo prominently on all its products. Given that its exports sales have been 
principally to the Jamaican diaspora, its hot pepper products are labelled 
picturing and identifying the type of pepper used rather than a scene redolent 
of their origin. The bright colours used for this labelling ensures that the black 
and white GK logo stands out, making it readily distinguishable from that of 
other competing Jamaican companies.
5.3 Exploitation of price seasonality
The prices for perishable foodstuffs rise markedly in importing countries during 
periods when there is no domestic production and the supply from foreign 
countries is reduced. The geographic positioning of the Caribbean and western 
Pacific countries means that for some crops natural harvest periods coincide 
with these times of short supply in importing countries. There is also some scope 
for changing the timing of harvests on tropical islands due the permanently 
humid nature of the weather and the relatively small seasonal changes in 
ambient temperature.  In Haiti, mangoes can be harvested for 11 months of the 
year, allowing the US and other markets to be supplied when mangoes are not 
available from Mexico and other regional suppliers that have shorter harvesting 
seasons. In the case of the Pacific, Samoa is able to supply New Zealand from 
September to February when citrus are not being harvested locally, while Tonga 
has been able to supply squash to Japan and watermelon to New Zealand 
when local production is unavailable in those countries. 
5.4 Domestic niche markets
In Jamaica, there is a niche market for processed eggs in the hospitality 
market. The case study of the egg processing chain focuses on an effort by 
the Jamaica Egg Farmers Association to stimulate demand for domestically 
produced eggs by processing them into a form suitable for this market. 
In the Solomon Islands a niche market for cut flowers emerged following the 
arrival of RAMSI personnel and their families in 2003. This has led to small-scale 
flower growing and arranging in the national capital Honiara. 
6. Non-Tar if f  Import Barr iers
It is widely recognised that developed countries often use SPS border controls 
to protect domestic industries from imports. Fiji’s attempts to increase its taro 
exports to Australia are a graphic illustration of this. The intractability of the 
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problem is demonstrated by the fact that Australia devotes a substantial 
proportion of its total aid budget to the PICs but is nevertheless prepared 
to go to extraordinary lengths to protect its small domestic taro industry at 
the expense of small-scale PIC growers. A similarly extreme example of the 
problem is the US Government’s inconsistent approach to facilitating the 
exportation of papaya from Fiji. Some 15 years ago, USAID helped to establish 
a facility in Fiji for the quarantine treatment for fruits, yet USDA APHIS has yet 
to approve the importation of papaya that passes through this facility.58 
7. Chain Development and Governance
The nine value chains differ significantly in the extent to which they have 
been initiated, designed and coordinated by a dominant enterprise. To a 
large extent this stems from the choice of chains to be studied since some 
refer to entire commodity sub-sectors while others are confined to production 
which flows through a single enterprise. Notwithstanding this, there are 
interesting differences in the entities that have been dominant in establishing 
and driving the chains.
Single expatriates have played an important part in both initiating and 
developing the chains for the production and export of high value cocoa 
products from Grenada and for vanilla produced in Vanuatu. The activities 
in both chains would appear to have been highly dependent on the energy 
and commitment of these two individuals. The sustainability of these chains 
over the long-term must therefore be questionable.
The value chain for processed eggs in Jamaica is the only chain that has 
been developed in stages according to a formal plan aimed at meeting a 
specific objective. This development was formally initiated by the Jamaican 
Egg Farmers Association but was driven subsequently by a subset of members 
of the association who were interested and able to make an investment 
in the joint venture. The citrus value chain in Belize was created by several 
pioneering businessmen and evolved through an explicit attempt to create 
a producer-run industry. It has been managed largely as intended until the 
recent split from the Citrus Growers Association of a set of large growers.
In Fiji, NWC has played a dominant role in developing the papaya export 
value chain despite the fact that it was established initially to own and 
58  Note that, unlike the example of taro exports to Australia, the distance to the USA means that it is 
at best a marginal potential market for Fijian papaya. 
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manage an export treatment facility. This is partly because the cooperative 
status of NWC has made it an acceptable conduit for donor assistance to 
the whole chain but also because of the continuity of skilled and committed 
senior managers who have remained unchanged for almost two decades.
JMB obtains its mangoes from a number of sources. It worked with donors in 
developing one of these sources - the association of small-scale producers, 
ASPVEFS - and it has worked in liaison with NGOs and donors to increase the 
efficiency of Haiti’s mango sub-sector.
Two of the value chains have developed naturally without any plan or project 
and without the dominance of any value chain actor, namely taro in Fiji and 
cut flowers in the Solomon Islands.
8. Inclusiveness
Most farming in ACP countries is small-scale. Most farm households acquire 
inputs and sell at least a part of their output. For all the commodities included 
in the case studies, most or all of the output is sold. Much of this output 
is processed, stored, transported, and bought and sold on one or more 
occasions before it is finally consumed or used. Thus, most farm households 
are involved in agricultural commodity chains and rely on their existence for 
their livelihood. Other participants in such chains, in turn, could not function 
without the activities of farm households. These households provide a final 
market for chains that supply farm inputs and services and they are the 
source of produce for the processing and marketing enterprises that operate 
downstream in agricultural commodity chains.
It is possible for an agricultural commodity chain to function if the purchase 
of inputs and the selling of outputs is the only interaction which farmers 
have with enterprises in the rest of the chain. However, it is now recognised 
that such chains can function more efficiently and effectively when small 
farmers have additional links with input and service suppliers and users of 
their produce. Value chain service providers can supply farmers with finance, 
information and training. Rural stockists can help farmers finance their 
activities by supplying them with inputs on credit. Farmers can also cooperate 
with buyers of their produce to ensure that they supply a product that is 
suited to the physical characteristics and reliability and timing of supply 
required by final consumers and end users. This has the potential to result in 
larger volumes sold, reduced losses along the chain, a higher final price for 
the end product and, possibly, a higher farm-gate price. It is also possible 
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for small-scale farmers to negotiate arrangements with buyers that reduce 
the risks that they face when buying from and selling into free markets. 
Thus, greater integration of small-scale farmers into value chains can have 
mutually beneficial outcomes both for the farmers themselves and for other 
value chain participants.
In the sub-sections below, we examine means of small-scale farmer inclusion in 
value chains that go beyond their simply being a provider of the raw material 
on which the chain is founded. We focus on the interaction of farmers with other 
enterprises trading commercially within the chain and with providers of techno-
logical, marketing, business management and financial services.
8.1 Both upstream and downstream integration 
The case studies contain three examples of farmer associations or 
cooperatives that are involved in activities that are both upstream and 
downstream of the farm-production stage of the value chain. These 
associations and cooperatives include small-scale farmers, although in two 
cases - the Belize Citrus Growers Association (BCGA) and the Jamaica Egg 
Farmers Association (JEFA) - the majority of output within the value chain is 
produced by medium and large-scale farmers
Citrus: Belize The BCGA provides all members with a comprehensive set of 
services which largely isolate them from the private sector. It has its own Citrus 
Research and Education Institute, it provides information, advice and training 
to growers, and it provides growers with credit and services which they would 
otherwise need to obtain from private enterprises. It operates nurseries that 
provide healthy and improved planting material, runs an input supply sales 
store from which growers can purchase chemical inputs and diesel at cost 
price, and provides machinery for weeding citrus groves. Downstream from its 
members’ farms, it assists with the transport of their produce, and negotiates 
quality-based prices for the sale of their produce. BCGA is also the majority 
owner of CPBL which owns all of Belize’s large-scale citrus processing plants. 
BCGA’s support services are funded by a levy on growers, the government So-
cial Security Revolving Loan Fund and an EIB low interest loan. Of all the case-
study chains, the BCGA value chain is ostensibly by far the most inclusive of 
growers. However, it is open to question whether smaller growers are better off 
than if a more competitive open-market system had been allowed to develop, 
since the smallest farmers have no voice in how the chain is managed, there is 
substantial overcapacity in processing facilities, until recently CPBL operated at 
a loss for a number of years, and a set of large farmers have broken away from 
BCGA, depriving it of much of its income.
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Eggs: Jamaica In addition to providing advice and training to farmers, 
JEFA procures inputs in bulk which it on-sells to farmers, it supports national 
egg nutrition promotion programmes in Jamaica aimed at promoting the 
domestic demand for eggs and, through some of its members, it is a part-
owner of a domestic egg processing plant. The organisation is unusual in that 
its membership comprises large-scale farmers, but it is funded partly by levies 
on inputs purchased by small and medium scale farmers, who, in turn, receive 
services from it.
Papaya: Fiji Output for this chain is produced by some 200 small-scale 
farmers. The majority of these are members of NWC, which undertakes pre-
export quarantine treatment of papaya and other crops. NWC is currently 
hosting the Fiji Papaya Project, which is supporting research and the 
strengthening of the value chain. Growers’ membership of NWC allows them 
to assist in steering these activities.
Vanilla: Vanuatu There are about 300 vanilla growers, all of which are small-
scale. VV and the FSA jointly provide appropriate low cost curing equipment 
and training to these growers. Downstream, both the FSA and VV assist in 
collecting and transporting farmers’ beans to VV’s facility. This assistance is 
largely unstructured and has evolved due to the long-standing partnership 
between VV and the FSA and the fact that, as the only buyer, it is in VV’s 
interest to assist farmers with the marketing of their crop. The FSA provides 
the internal control for the organic certification process. This activity receives 
donor support.
8.2 Upstream integration
Hot Peppers: Jamaica This value chain is based on the output of some 25-35 
small and medium-scale farmers. Under GK’s contract farming arrangements 
aimed at acquiring a steady supply of peppers for its mash factory, farmers 
receive inputs from Agro Grace farm and gardening supply branches 
at discounted prices and with deferred payment. They also benefit from 
technical assistance provided by GAPD with the help of the Rural Agricultural 
Development Authority. Farmers receive a preset price for their sales. They 
have no involvement in downstream activities.
8.3 Downstream integration
Mangoes: Haiti The value chain selected in Haiti for study was for mangoes 
supplied to a private exporter, JMB. A part of its supplies are acquired from 
an association of mango growers, ASPVEFS, whose members are entirely 
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small-scale growers. Although ASPVEFS provides some services related to 
mango growing, its main function is downstream, namely to harvest, select, 
pack and sell fruits. It in effect does this as a business, buying the fruits on the 
tree and selling them to JMB for export, to a donor-supported dehydration 
facility for sale locally in dried form, and to traders for sale and consumption 
in the domestic market. The main advantages for small-scale growers are 
that (a) their mangoes are picked selectively and carefully sorted, (b) they 
are sold to ASPVEFS at prices which reflect net market value rather than at 
prices negotiated with local traders, and (c) ASPVEFS has obtained fairtrade 
certification allowing the part of their output which is exported to be sold at 
premium prices.
In addition to the supply from members of ASPVEFS, JMB acquires a 
proportion of its mangoes from private traders who, in turn, purchase from 
small-scale producers and gatherers from feral trees. These producers use few 
inputs and sell their crop to traders on the tree. Thus, their only contact with 
the value chain is with these traders at the time of harvest, other than where 
traders lend to them in advance of the harvest. 
8.4 Other
Taro: Fiji Most taro is grown by small and medium-scale growers. These sell for 
cash to marketing agents at the farm-gate and have no further contact with 
downstream operators. 
Cocoa: Grenada The value chain covers the output of a large estate and 13 
small-scale farmers, all of which have holdings larger than most agricultural 
holdings in Grenada, which are of less than one acre. Thus, although some 
25% of the cocoa entering the value chain is produced on small-scale farms, 
the chain is not inclusive of typical Grenadian small-scale farmers.
Cut flowers: Solomon Islands The value chain is short and straightforward 
with little opportunity for inclusive arrangements other than for the informal 
networks that some households have developed for selling cut flowers and 
flower arrangements. 
9. Green Aspects of Chain Development
The need to reverse the adverse impact of population growth and economic 
development on the environment is now widely recognised. This requires that 
natural resources are used efficiently and that the destruction of existing 
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natural resources through erosion, pollution, and carbon emission is minimised. 
Consequently, it is important that existing and new agricultural value chains 
are as ‘green’ as possible.
One of the main means of reducing environmental damage and conserving 
natural resources is to improve the output achieved from a given set of 
resources,59 thereby minimising the resource use necessary to meet demand. 
For example, planting seeds at the correct depth at the correct time can 
increase output significantly without the need for additional resources. Many 
such means are often not thought of as green, even though they may make 
a major contribution to the environment. This should be borne in mind when 
evaluating the importance of explicit green measures.
In addition to the external benefits that stem from greener chains, it is possible 
for value-chain enterprises, including farmers, to benefit directly from the 
adoption of green practices, since such practices can reduce unit costs and/
or raise final product prices. To obtain higher, green final product prices, there 
is usually need for cooperation between enterprises at different levels of the 
chain. In addition, for farmers to benefit from higher final prices, a part of the 
price increase must be transmitted back to them.
The majority of the value chains contain examples of initiatives taken by 
chain participants to adopt green practices in either the growing of the crop, 
during processing, or during the treatment of waste. Only in the cases of taro 
growing has development of the value chain caused serious damage to 
the environment and required explicit measures to reverse the damage. In 
all the other cases, chain-development has either not had obvious adverse 
environmental impacts or steps have been taken to introduce greener 
methods to reduce such impacts.
9.1 Adverse environmental impacts
Within a few years of the collapse of Samoan taro production, taro growing 
on the Fijian island of Taveuni had become a major export industry. The high 
returns on offer to growers saw the transformation of subsistence, garden-
based cropping systems into intensive monoculture involving land clearance 
and high rates of application of chemical fertilisers. Despite Taveuni’s robust 
volcanic soils, the pressure of intensive production soon resulted in a decline 
in yields. Farmers responded by increasing the amounts of fertiliser applied 
59  Note that increasing the short-term return to a single resource, such as land, can be environmen-
tally damaging, as demonstrated by the example of taro in Fiji. 
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and expanding cultivation into new locations in higher elevation forested 
areas. This resulted in the destruction of forests and degradation of the soil 
on both existing and newly cleared land. The end result was a decline in taro 
corm size and an accompanying decline in the per-hectare yields, as well as 
the degradation of water catchments.
Remedial action to address the problem is now being initiated. A group of 
farmers are adopting radical changes in production practices, focused on 
the rehabilitation of depleted acidic soils through the introduction of the 
legume mucuna bean (Mucuna pruriens) and the application of lime. A 
change in the mindset of taro growers is being driven by two Taveuni-based 
grower organisations, Teitei Taveuni and Marist Tutu Rural Training Centre, 
which are spearheading efforts to reverse the decline in productivity through 
the adoption of sustainable farming practices. These efforts are being 
supported by technical and financial inputs from a set of outside entities, 
including ACIAR, the Organic Matters Foundation (OMF), AusAID, Caritas 
Australia, SPC, UNDP, and the Fiji Ministry of Agriculture.
9.2 Green initiatives at the production level
The lack of significant price premiums for organic production in the Australian 
and New Zealand markets means that the only example of organic 
certification amongst the PIC case studies is vanilla grown on Vanuatu. Vanilla 
production is organic on all the seven islands where the crop is grown. Vanilla 
vines have root systems that spread just below the surface making heavy 
mulching the best means of providing nutrition while simultaneously aerating, 
protecting and enhancing water retention in the soil, protecting the roots 
from the sun and controlling weeds.60 A wide range of mulching material is 
recommended, including byproducts and waste products from other crops, 
such as coconut husks, cocoa pods and oil palm waste. The main benefit 
that accrues from organic certification may in some instances be the indirect 
advantage of making exports more marketable rather than the achieving 
of an explicit organic price premium. This has proved to be the case for 
Vanuatu’s vanilla value chain.
Amongst the Caribbean case studies, two value chains are organic, that for 
the production of mangoes in Haiti produced by members of the Associations 
of Fruit Producers and Sellers from the South (ASPVEFS) and cocoa in Grenada 
produced by the Grenada Organic Cocoa Farmers Co-operative Society.
60  Piero Bianchessi, Vanilla Handbook, Venui Vanilla, 2012.
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In Haiti, mangoes are grown organically without any use of fertilisers or other 
agro-chemicals. In the past, this was considered a factor inhibiting growth of 
the industry but it is now being exploited as a means of raising export prices. 
The exporter, JMB, has adopted a strategy of working with selected small-
scale grower cooperatives in certified growing regions in the north-west of 
Haiti, to progressively obtain USDA and BCSOko-Guarantie certification for the 
output of each.
The organic value chain for cocoa in Grenada is the only chain amongst 
the case studies that has been developed explicitly as a green chain with 
the dual objectives of enhancing the environment and raising additional 
income to be used to improve the livelihoods of cocoa growers and workers 
engaged in the domestic manufacture of chocolate and other cocoa-based 
products. Its target markets have been tourists visiting Grenada, especially 
those making short stops on cruise ships, and niche gourmet markets in the 
UK and USA. At the farm level, chemical fertilisers have been replaced by 
the use of organic mulches, including cocoa production and fermentation 
byproducts (pods and shells) and composted ruminant and pig manure. 
In Belize, BCGA and CPBL have promoted green production techniques, 
including the use of integrated pest management and more efficient use of 
fertilisers and plant hormones to raise yields per hectare while reducing the 
use of agricultural chemicals. In Haiti, JMB, the US retailer Whole Foods, the 3M 
Corporation and a number of donors have supported the training of mango 
farmers in a range of green production and post-harvest measures, including 
the infilling of small plots, reforestation, the top grafting of less desirable 
species with export varieties, and improved post-harvest techniques aimed at 
reducing losses.
In Jamaica, JEFA supplies waste generated by poultry to fruit and vegetable 
farmers for use as fertiliser, while GAPD has promoted measures to increase 
the efficiency of land and water use by its contracted hot pepper farmers.
9.3 Green initiatives involving processing and transport
Of the commodities covered by the PIC case studies, a part of the vanilla 
grown in Vanuatu is processed prior to final consumption or use.61 Amongst 
the Caribbean case studies, all or most of all the crops are processed and/or 
quarantine-treated domestically.
61  All vanilla is cured on farm. A proportion of the cured vanilla is processed into extract and paste by 
VV.
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Crops which are normally processed prior to consumption or before being 
utilised in manufacture are most commonly processed near to the point 
of production. There are two main reasons for this. First, processing usually 
reduces the weight of the main product, thereby reducing transport costs. 
A good example of this is citrus processing, where the juice is pressed from 
the fruit and then concentrated with the aim of reducing both the weight 
and volume transported. Second, some crops are rapidly perishable. If heavy 
losses are to be avoided, they must be utilised rapidly. Hot peppers are an 
example. If destined for export, it makes commercial sense to process such 
crops domestically, except where they can only be consumed in fresh form or 
unless the fresh form has a value in foreign markets that is substantially higher 
than the total value of the products processed from it.62
The domestic processing of export crops that results in a loss of weight and/
or volume is of itself a ‘green’ activity in that it lowers the amount of polluting 
transport required for shipment to foreign markets. However, if the processed 
product is packaged domestically, and especially if it is bottled, weight and 
volume are added, offsetting and possibly wiping out the green transport 
advantage gained from processing near the source of production.
In four of the five value chains covered by the Caribbean case studies, all or 
most of the crop is processed prior to export. In Grenada, the manufacture of 
chocolate products has additionally allowed a part of the country’s cocoa 
production that was formerly exported to be consumed domestically, thereby 
reducing transport costs further, albeit by a minute amount.
In Belize, in addition to the green gains from exporting frozen citrus 
concentrate rather than whole oranges or normal strength juice, CPBL also: 
• minimises the amount of resources used in citrus production for any given 
level of export by minimising losses during processing through (a) investing 
in state-of-the-art processing equipment and (b) testing fruit maturity prior 
to harvesting and systematically planning and scheduling fruit deliveries
• uses solid byproducts productively to extract citrus oils, to make organic 
fertiliser, to make cattle feed, and to use as a fuel for the generation of 
electricity
• biologically cleanses liquid wastes using effluent ponds, and processes 
residual solids into byproducts
62  This total may include byproducts sold domestically.
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• seeks to reduce carbon emissions by, inter alia, switching from diesel and 
bunker fuel to sweet crude oil.
By establishing its own hot pepper mash processing facility in Jamaica, GK 
has reduced the need for Jamaican processors to import mash from Central 
America, thereby reducing transport costs. It has further reduced transport 
costs by manufacturing a part of its pepper-mash based products in the UK, 
thereby needing to ship only mash to the UK rather than bottles and other 
retail packaging.
Also in Jamaica, JEFA’s Caribbean Egg Processors subsidiary renders waste 
eggshells into organic fertiliser.
The hot water treatment facility introduced by JMB in Haiti to eliminate 
fruit flies from export consignments allows Haitian mangoes to be exported 
without resort to more invasive agrochemical-based means of eliminating 
fruit flies.
9.4 Reasons for the adoption of green practices
Virtually all the green practices adopted by farmers and enterprises 
operating in the case-study value chains yield returns to the adopter. There 
are five conceptually distinct mechanisms for this:
• First, environmentally sound practices can result in lower unit production 
costs at the growing, post-harvest, processing and transport stages of the 
value chain. The low-cost organic methods used for producing and curing 
vanilla in Vanuatu, the use of solar power in the processing of cocoa on 
Grenada and the use of sea rather than air-freight for fresh exports from 
the PICs are examples of green-based unit cost reduction at each of these 
chain stages.
• Second, such practices can raise farm production and the total output 
of processors. In the case of farm production, this is mainly through the 
impact of conservation and improvement of the quality of resources 
available to farmers, especially their soils. The organic farming of cocoa in 
Grenada and the conservation practices being implemented on mango 
farms in Haiti are examples of this. In the case of processing, total output 
can be raised by switching from disposing to making productive use of 
potentially polluting waste products. CPBL has done this by converting 
both its hard and liquid waste into a range of valuable products, including 
essential oils, organic fertiliser and fuel. 
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• Third, the certification of one or more of a value chain’s end products as 
organic or produced using other environmentally sound methods can lead 
to higher selling prices, which can be passed back in full or in part up the 
value chain. The most striking example of this is the organic farming, curing 
and manufacture of cocoa-based products in Grenada. In practice, the 
costs of certification can be high, especially where production is small-
scale, scattered and farmers do not market their commodity collectively, 
as in the case of vanilla in Vanuatu, where certification is not commercially 
viable for over half of all production.
• Fourth, even where organic produce commands little or no retail price 
premium, organic or some other form of environmental or hygiene-based 
certification may enhance market access by demonstrating that the 
supplier is dependable and likely to be a stable long-term partner with 
whom to do business. This has been exploited by Venui Vanilla as a means 
of obtaining more ready access to regional markets for its vanilla products. 
Similarly, CPBL has used its Almost-Pesticide-Free status to attract EU and 
Japanese bottlers concerned with the environmental friendliness of their 
supply chain.
• Finally, green practices may improve the socio-political environment in 
which the chain operates. For example, productive use by CPBL of its citrus 
processing byproducts means that the communities in the proximity of its 
citrus plant no longer have to suffer from local discharge of putrid smelling 
and environmentally damaging waste organic matter.
10. External Factors  
10.1 Tax and trade policy
The case studies provide good examples of the importance of conducive 
fiscal and trading arrangements relating to both domestic marketing and 
international trade. 
In Fiji, NWC lobbied successfully for the removal of a 32% import duty on 
plastic crates. The resulting reduction in domestic crate prices has led to 
them becoming the norm for internal transport of fresh fruit, improving returns 
along value chains for papaya and other horticultural produce.
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In Belize, CPBL benefits from two fiscal arrangements which increase its 
competitiveness in export markets. Under the Lomé Caribbean Basin Initiative, 
it is able to export its citrus products to the EU free of import duty. Belize’s 
membership of CARICOM allows it to sell its products into Caribbean markets 
protected from external competition by a 35% common external tariff.
10.2 Infrastructure
The importance for agricultural marketing of good rural access roads is 
widely recognised. For nations comprising sets of small islands, efficient 
inter-island transport is also important, both for domestically consumed and 
exported produce. Appropriately located all-weather wharfs where roll-
on roll-off vessels can berth safely are particularly important for perishable 
commodities, since the use of such vessels reduces the total journey time. In 
Fiji, the initiation of a RoRo service from Taveuni to Viti Levu was an important 
factor in the rapid development of a national taro export industry. 
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The fact that the case studies were not randomly selected means that it is not 
possible to make a general comparative analysis of value chains within the two 
regions. However, there are two sets of case studies that have many common 
features coupled with interesting differences: those relating to mangoes in Haiti 
and papaya in Fiji and to cocoa in Grenada and vanilla in Vanuatu.
1.  Comparison of the JMB Mango Value Chain in 
Haiti  with the Value Chain for Papaya Exports 
from Fij i
It should be noted that the value chain in the Haitian case study refers 
to mangoes passing through a single exporter only, whereas that for Fiji 




• are for a perishable fresh fruit grown principally by small-scale farmers
• have domestic and export markets for the fruit
• were disrupted by decisions to ban exportation to the country’s main, well 
established developed-country markets due to fruit fly infestation
• received US government assistance to establish acceptable means of pre-
export treatment
• have a set of private sector exporters
• have received donor and NGO assistance to develop the value chain
• are subject to severe hurricane/cyclone damage.
1.2 Differences
The most important difference to note is in the scale of the two country’s 
exports. Fiji’s total papaya exports amount only to some 800 tons, compared 
with the 10,000 tons of mangoes exported by Haiti. The differences in scale 
largely reflect the difference in the populations and land areas of the two 
countries. Haiti has almost 12 times the population of Fiji and 51% more land 
area of which it uses 70% for agriculture compared with 23% in Fiji. Haiti also 
has a higher percentage of its population engaged in farming.
In both countries exporters typically buy directly from farmers at prices negoti-
ated by their agents at the point of sale. The JMB value chain differs from that 
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in Fiji in that a proportion of its purchases are sourced from a cooperative (the 
ASPVEFS) which picks and markets its members’ fruits. There is no equivalent of 
ASPVEFS in Fiji, which does not have a strong cooperative tradition.
The key difference between the value chains is that all Fijian exports of 
papaya are treated prior to shipment for a fee at a single HTFA facility owned 
by a cooperative which has grower and exporter membership, whereas JMB 
treats its own purchased mangoes at its owns a hot water treatment facility. 
The main reason for this difference would seem to be the much larger scale 
of exports from Haiti. This means that a single exporting company is large 
enough to be able to finance its own treatment facility. In Fiji, donor finance 
was necessary due to the small size of the enterprises exporting papaya and 
other export crops needing quarantine treatment. The requirement for donor 
finance in Fiji, in turn, influenced the structure of the marketing chain, since 
the condition of USAID that the facility be operated commercially required 
the establishment of a cooperative. In this regard, it should be noted that the 
Fijian plant was established in 1996 when exports were even smaller than at 
present. By contrast JMB’s facility was established more recently in 2007, prior 
to the devastating 2010 earthquake.
A further difference between the two value chains is that a part of Haiti’s 
mango exports are organic, whereas Fiji has yet to exploit organic export 
markets for its papaya despite a potential for organic production in Fiji.63 
Again the main reason for this would seem to be difference in scale, in this 
case, the scale of the main markets. The nearest developed country market 
for Haiti is the USA, whereas for Fiji the only countries within reasonable 
proximity are the much smaller markets of Australia and New Zealand. In 
terms of the demand for organic fruits, this difference is exaggerated by the 
fact that, in the USA, organic produce can be sold at specialised outlets at 
greater price premiums than can be obtained in Australia and New Zealand. 
2.  Comparison of the Organic Cocoa Value Chain 
in Grenada with the Venui Vanil la Value Chain in 
Vanuatu
2.1 Similarities
The similarities are that:
63  K.N. Stice, L.D.Tora, and A.M. McGregor, The Economics of Growing Organic 
Papaya in Fiji, Koko Siga Pacific, Suva, Fiji Islands.
119C h A P t e R  I v
• both chains were established by and have been heavily dependent for 
their growth on a single person
• both persons were foreign nationals who endowed the chain with a 
combination of technical skills and business acumen and who were 
motivated in part by altruism
• both persons established companies that operate at the processing/
manufacturing stage and at the exporting stage of the value chain
• both focused on the processing of high-value, niche market products 
targeted at the top end of foreign markets and at tourists.
2.2 Differences
The two chains differ in that:
• cocoa production was already established in Grenada prior to creation of 
the value chain, whereas there was no commercial production of vanilla in 
Vanuatu
• cocoa production in Grenada is highly concentrated into one small area 
whereas vanilla production in Vanuatu takes place in remote locations on 
eight separate islands
• in Grenada a proportion of cocoa is grown using chemical fertiliser but 
the Grenada Cocoa Company (GCC) value chain is entirely organic; 
conversely in Vanuatu, vanilla production is almost entirely organic 
whereas only a part of the production passing down the Venui Vanilla (VV) 
chain is certified as such
• growers in the GCC chain are organised into a cooperative, whereas each 
VV grower operates independently
• The majority of cocoa entering the GCC value chain is produced by a 
single estate, the owners of which also undertake the initial processing of 
the beans produced by all other members of the cooperative, whereas 
Vanuatu’s vanilla growers are all small-scale and cure their own beans on-
farm
• VV is wholly family owned whereas all the GCC chain’s growers have 
shares in GCC
V A L U E  C H A I N S  I N  T H E  C A R I B B E A N  A N D  T H E  P A C I F I C  I S L A N D S120
• VV relies principally on the provision of a high quality product to ensure 
sale at a price premium, whereas the GCC aims to market its products as 
completely ‘green’, using publicity stunts such as carbon neutral delivery 
by sailing vessel.
These differences can be explained in part by differences between the 
geography and history of the nations of the Caribbean and of the South 
Pacific. The vast difference between the spatial concentrations of production 
is due in part to the fact that some of the Caribbean nations are extremely 
small in size and comprise a single inhabited island. Grenada is only 344 
km2 compared with Vanuatu’s total land area of 12,189 km2, and Grenada 
consists of only one main island whereas Vanuatu comprises an archipelago. 
The reason why the value chain in Grenada is supplied principally by a 
large estate but all production on Vanuatu is small-scale is that there was no 
history of vanilla growing in Vanuatu until the VV chain was developed. This 
meant that during the colonial era no vanilla estates were established and 
consequently there were no existing estates that could have been included 
in the chain.  
The fact that initial cocoa processing takes place off-farm in Grenada but on-
farm in Vanuatu is due principally to differences in the spatial concentration 
of production and in the storability of the harvested crop. The more scattered 
nature of vanilla growing in Vanuatu makes it impracticable for centralised 
processing of the fresh vanilla beans for which the first, water-killing stage 
of curing must be undertaken on the day of harvest. By contrast, cocoa 
production in Grenada is highly concentrated and newly harvested pods 
can be stored for up to four days prior to splitting and fermentation. 
The differences between the two chains in the ownership of the final 
processing/manufacturing and export company is due to a combination of 
(a) a much larger number of small-scale growers in Vanuatu than Grenada, 
(b) the lack of a cooperative tradition in Vanuatu that makes farmers 
reluctant to become involved in collective ownership, and (c) possibly 
differences in the means by which the founders of the chains have sought to 
benefit farmers.
2.3 Key-person dependency
Both chains have succeeded because their founders had the foresight to 
appreciate that their chain’s activities would only be viable if the high unit 
processing and marketing costs stemming from their small scale could be 
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offset by achieving exceptionally high export prices. In the case of the VV 
chain, this was a necessary condition for paying a price to growers that was 
sufficiently high to encourage them to begin growing vanilla and to maintain 
an interest in the crop. In the case of the GCC chain, this was necessary to 
induce farmers to grow organically rather than to produce conventionally 
using agricultural chemicals.
Both chains have been highly dependent on their founder’s combination 
of entrepreneurial, technical processing and marketing skills coupled 
with an altruistic aim of wishing to improve the livelihoods of low-income 
households. In Vanuatu, small-scale entrepreneurial investors have been at 
the vanguard of agro-processing development but, by their very nature, 
their enterprises suffer from being very key-person dependent. In the case 
of vanilla, the success of the chain is entirely dependent on the expertise of 
the proprietor and the niche markets developed by him. It is essential that 
founding entrepreneurs of small-scale value chains targeted at niche markets 
recognise the problem of key-person dependency and, during development 
of the chain, initiate the development of a sustainable export industry that is 
not solely dependent on their efforts.
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